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BARRY CUSHMAN

CAROLENE PRODUCTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's opinion for the majority in the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1938 decision in United States v Carolene Products'
is well known for its statement of two principles. The first concerns
the presumption of constitutionality to be accorded to legislation
regulating economic activity when challenged under the Due Process Clauses. "[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional," Stone
maintained, "unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that
it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators."2 The second principle emerges from
Stone's immediate qualification of the first principle in the famous
Footnote Four, where he suggested that such deferential review
would not be appropriate "when legislation appears on its face to
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific
Barry Cushman is John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law
School.
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when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."' Nor would
such a robust presumption of constitutionality be warranted with
respect to "legislation which restricts those political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation," nor with respect to "statutes directed at particular religious," "national," "racial," or other "discrete and insular minorities."'
This understanding of the meaning of Carolene Products is now
so firmly established' that it is easy to overlook the fact that the
decision once was regarded as marking an important step in the
development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This was so not
simply because the Court there upheld an exercise of the commerce
power-the Filled Milk Act of 1923 6-which prohibited the interstate shipment of the substance for which it was named. At a deeper
level, it was true because of the vital if often implicit role that Fifth
Amendment due process concepts had played in shaping and constraining federal power to prohibit transportation in interstate commerce. The understanding that lawyers once had of this relationship
between structural constitutional federalism and individual rights
has long been lost to us. It is the ambition of this article to reconstruct that understanding, and to show how Justice Stone's resolution of that relationship in Carolene Products laid the groundwork
not only for modern conceptions of judicial review, but also for a
conception of federal power that would predominate throughout
the remainder of the twentieth century.
Part I of this article charts the development of our modern understanding of the meaning of CaroleneProducts.For the first decade
or so following its announcement, we find, the case was treated by
the Court and by academics as a significant Commerce Clause precedent. It was only in the years following World War II, when earlier
understandings of Commerce Clause jurisprudence began to fade,
Id at 152 n 4.
Id at 152-53 n 4.
The literature here is vast. Among the more noteworthy contributions are John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory offudicial Review (Harvard, 1980); David A. Strauss,
Is Carolene Products Obsolete? 2010 U Ill L Rev 1251 (2010); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713 (1985); Robert Cover, The Origins offudicialActivism
in the Protectionsof Minorities, 91 Yale L J 1287 (1982).
* An Act to Prohibit the Shipment of Filled Milk in Interstate or Foreign Commerce
("Filled Milk Act"), 42 Stat 1486 (1923).
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that the modern understanding began to eclipse its more inclusive
predecessor.
Part II provides the doctrinal and analytic framework necessary
to appreciate the significance of Carolene Products' contribution to
Commerce Clause development. This part offers a reinterpretation
of the line of cases upholding the constitutionality of federal statutes
prohibiting the interstate shipment of such disfavored items as lottery tickets,' adulterated or mislabeled food and drugs,' alcoholic
beverages,' and stolen automobiles.o These decisions stand in stark
contrast to the case of Hammer v Dagenhart," where the Court
invalidated the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916,12 which
prohibited the interstate shipment of goods made by firms employing children. The apparent inconsistencies in this line of cases
have long puzzled and frustrated students of American constitutional history. Part II aims to reconcile this seemingly contradictory
body of case law. The key to doing so, I argue, lies in seeing that
what we have regarded as "Commerce Clause cases" are in fact best
understood as turning on issues of vested rights and substantive due
process. More particularly, I maintain that these cases are best understood, as a number of sophisticated contemporary legal observers
understood them, as standing for the following proposition: that
once a property right in an item had vested under the applicable
state law, the Due Process Clauses prohibited either Congress or
sister state legislatures from disadvantageously regulating the disposition of that item unless such a disposition threatened the infliction of a cognizable harm within the legislative jurisdiction of
the regulating sovereign. In the absence of a threat that such a
' An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic Through National and Interstate Commerce and the Postal Service Subject to the Jurisdiction and Laws of the United States,
28 Stat 963 (1895), upheld in Champion v Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 US 321 (1903).
' An Act for Preventing the Manufacture, Sale, or Transportation of Adulterated or
Misbranded or Poisonous or Deleterious Foods, Drugs, Medicines, and Liquors, and for
Regulating Traffic Therein, and for Other Purposes ("Pure Food Act"), 34 Stat 768 (1906),
upheld in Hipolite Egg Co. v United States, 220 US 45 (1910).
9 An Act Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate Character in Certain Cases
("Webb-Kenyon Act"), 37 Stat 699 (1913), upheld in ClarkDistilling Co. v Western Maryland
Railway Co., 242 US 311 (1917).
o An Act to Punish the Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles in Interstate or Foreign
Commerce ("National Motor Vehicle Theft Act"), 41 Stat 324 (1919), upheld in Brooks
v United States, 267 US 432 (1925).
247 US 251 (1918).
12 An Act to Prevent Interstate Commerce in the Products of Child Labor, and for
Other Purposes ("Keating-Owen Child Labor Act"), 39 Stat 675 (1916).
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cognizable harm might be inflicted within Congress's legislative
jurisdiction, therefore, a federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of an item deprived its owner of property without due process
of law. Equipped with this understanding of the doctrine, we can
then see that the decision in Hammer is best understood as turning
on a distinction between the types of extraterritorial harm that the
Court regarded as legally privileged," and those that the Justices
were prepared to recognize as falling outside the protection of the
Due Process Clause.
Part III begins the effort to specify the role of Carolene Products
in transforming this body of doctrine. Here I reconstruct the legislative history of the Filled Milk Act of 1923, demonstrating that
the debates over its constitutionality turned on conceptions of harm
derived from the Court's due process jurisprudence. Part IV follows
the litigation over that act to the Supreme Court. Here we see that
Justice Stone accomplished two important tasks. First, he clarified
the doctrine by recognizing that in cases involving federal prohibitions on interstate shipment, the due process issue was analytically
distinct from the Commerce Clause issue, and was in fact the issue
on which the question of constitutionality hinged. Second, and more
famously, Justice Stone announced that henceforth, in these and
other cases involving challenges to economic regulation under the
Due Process Clauses, the Court would accord a broad measure of
deference to legislative judgments concerning harm. Part V then
examines the contemporary significance of this liberation of the
commerce power from its former due process restraints, documenting the important role that it played in the legislative history
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and in the Court's decision
upholding that act and overruling Hammer in United States v Darby
Lumber Co." Part VI reviews the underappreciated role of individual
rights in shaping the history and functioning of American constitutional federalism.

I.

CAROLENE PRODUCTS IN HISTORICAL MEMORY

It is not surprising that Carolene Products is today remem-

bered for the principles of deferential review of economic regulation
" See, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv L
Rev 1 (1894); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16 (1913).
14 312 US 100 (1941).
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and heightened review under Footnote Four, because those are the
principles for which it is cited in our casebooks on Constitutional
Law." This has now been the case for more than half a century.
When Professor John Frank of Yale Law School published his casebook in 1950, he included Carolene Products as a principal case in
the section on due process and economic regulation,'" and placed
a discussion of Footnote Four in the section on speech and reli" See Jesse H. Choper et al, ConstitutionalLaw: Cases-Comments-Questions(West, 11th
ed 2011) (due process holding briefly summarized at p 368; every other mention is of
Footnote Four, see pp 295, 368, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 449, 577, 578, 1361, 1374, 1375,
1425, 1472, 1489, 1490, 1498, 1662); Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw (Aspen, 3d
ed 2009) (all references are to Footnote Four, either together with the due process holding,
see pp 626-28, 724, or alone, see pp 755, 946); Gregory E. Maggs and Peter J. Smith,
ConstitutionalLaw: A Contemporary Approach (West, 2d ed 2011) (due process holding briefly
summarized at p 526; remaining references are to Footnote Four, see pp 526-27, 634,
811); Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw (Foundation, 17th ed
2010) (every mention is either to due process and Footnote Four together, see pp 39192, or to Footnote Four alone, see p 768); Michael Stokes Paulsen et al, The Constitution
of the United States (Foundation,2010) (every mention is either to due process, see p 1522,
or to due process together with Footnote Four, see p 1527); Calvin Massey, American
ConstitutionalLaw: Powers and Liberties(Aspen, 2d ed 2005) (every mention is to due process,
see p 473, or to Footnote Four, see pp 48, 613, 645, 665, 717, 723); Jerome A. Barron
et al, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (LexisNexis, 7th ed 2006) (every mention
is to due process together with Footnote Four, see pp 474-75, or to Footnote Four alone,
see pp 663, 910-11); William C. Banks and Rodney A. Smolla, ConstitutionalLaw: Structure
and Rights in Our FederalSystem (LexisNexis, 6th ed 2010) (every mention is to Footnote
Four, see pp 525-26, 598); William D. Araiza and M. Isabel Medina, Constitutional Law:
Cases, History, and Practice (LexisNexis, 4th ed 2011) (every mention is either to due process
together with Footnote Four, see pp 725-27, or to Footnote Four alone, see pp 754, 755,
970, 1211, 1214, 1245); Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Phillip P. Frickey,
Cases and Materialson ConstitutionalLaw: Themes for the Constitution'sThird Century (West,
4th ed 2009) (every mention is to due process, see p 497, Footnote Four, see pp 36-38,
or the two of them together, see p 35); John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw (West, 8th ed 2010) (every mention is to due process together with Footnote
Four, see pp 482, 486, 1271-72, or to Footnote Four alone, see pp 392, 494, 499, 750);
Geoffrey R. Stone et al, ConstitutionalLaw (Aspen, 6th ed 2009) (every mention is to due
process, see pp 501, 755, 756, 758, Footnote Four, see pp 147, 523, 524, 684, 687, 688,
692, 764, 766, 852, or the two together, see pp 693, 760, 761); Charles A. Shanor, American
ConstitutionalLaw: Structure and Reconstruction (West, 3d ed 2006) (every mention is to
Footnote Four, see pp 8, 680, 712); Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw (Foundation, 2d ed 1988) (every mention is to Footnote Four, see pp 129, 607, 644, 772, 778,
780, 845, 1320, 1452, 1465, 1515, 1523, 1544, 1588, 1614, 1686, or to Footnote Four
together with due process, see p 582). See also Norman Redlich, John Attanasio, andJoel
K. Goldstein, ConstitutionalLaw (LexisNexis, 5th ed 2008) (citations to Footnote Four at
pp 393, 586, 650, 686); Jonathan D. Varat, William Cohen, and Vikram D. Amar, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials(Foundation, 13th ed 2009) (citations to due process
and Footnote Four at pp 564-66); Paul Brest et al, Processesof ConstitutionalDecisionmaking:
Cases and Materials (Aspen, 4th ed 2000) (citations to due process at p 523, to Footnote
Four at pp 99, 618, 897, 948, 1040, 1126, 1280, 1291, 1493, 1500, and to both at pp 42833, 869); David Crump et al, Cases and Materials on ConstitutionalLaw (LexisNexis, 5th
ed 2009) (citations to due process and Footnote Four at pp 38, 349, and to Footnote Four
alone at p 626).
" John P. Frank, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 671-74 (Callaghan, 1950).
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gion." That same year Columbia Professor Noel Dowling published the fourth edition of his casebook, where he featured Footnote Four in the introduction to the section on free speech and
press." The presence of Footnote Four in the Dowling text would
expand in subsequent editions, after Gerald Gunther joined the
casebook.19 When Harvard's Paul Freund, Arthur Sutherland, Mark
De Wolfe Howe, and Ernest Brown published the first edition of
their casebook in 1954, every mention of Carolene Products was of
Footnote Four.20 University of Michigan Professor Paul Kauper's
first edition, published the same year, also emphasized Footnote
Four,2' along with a brief mention in a string cite of economic
regulations upheld against due process challenges in the Progressive
and New Deal periods." By 1959, the lone citation to Carolene
Products in Tulane Dean Ray Forrester's casebook would be as the
origin of the notion that the First Amendment occupied a "preferred
status."23 By the 1960s and 1970s, the understanding of Carolene
Products that emerges from a review of today's teaching materials
had begun to take firm shape.
This presentation of Carolene Products in our casebooks mirrors
the Supreme Court's treatment of the precedent in the years following World War II. In the 1950s the Justices cited the decision
in only four cases, each time for one of the two principles identified
above.2 4 In the 1960s the Court cited the case only a half-dozen
times, in equal proportions for deferential review and Footnote
" Id at 838.

" Noel Dowling, Cases on Constitutional Law 925-26 (Foundation, 4th ed 1950).
' See Gerald Gunther and Noel Dowling, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law
(Foundation, 8th ed 1970) at 755, 838, 1031, 1051, 1102, 1385; Gerald Gunther, Cases
and Materials on ConstitutionalLaw (Foundation, 9th ed 1975) at 24, 309, 377, 584, 593,
637, 653, 681, 684, 754, 755, 1028, 1041, 1047. Citations to Footnote Four would taper
off dramatically in later editions. See, for example, Gerald Gunther, Cases and Materials
on ConstitutionalLaw (Foundation, 10th ed 1980) at 284, 534, 541, 1106; Gerald Gunther,
ConstitutionalLaw (Foundation, 12th ed 1991) at 458, 463, 996.
20 Paul A. Freund et al, ConstitutionalLaw: Cases and Materials 1350, 1433, 1482 (Little,
Brown, 1954).
2

Paul Kauper, ConstitutionalLaw: Cases and Materials 71, 890 (Prentice-Hall, 1954).

2

Id at 779.

2

Ray Forrester, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 717 (West, 1959).
Breard v City ofAlexandria, 341 US 622, 640 n 29 (1951); Dennis v United States, 341

24

US 494, 525-27, 559 (1951); American CommunicationsAssociation, CIO v Douds, 339 US
382, 423 n 1 (1950) (Jackson, J, concurring and dissenting); Secretary of Agriculture v
Central Roig Refining Co., 338 US 604, 616 (1950).
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Four.2 5 Citations more than doubled in the 1970s, and here references to Footnote Four began to predominate.26 In the 1980s,
following John Hart Ely's elegant elaboration of Footnote Four
into a general representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review,27 citations nearly doubled again, with Footnote Four retaining
its preeminence.28 In the past two decades the frequency of citation
has declined, but Footnote Four remains the principal reason for
judicial mention of the decision. In our modem constitutional
25 Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 655 n 15 (1966); Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US
294, 304 (1964); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v Paul, 373 US 132, 175 (1963)
(White, J, dissenting); Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590, 596 (1962); Braunfeld
v Brown, 366 US 599, 613 (1961) (Brennan, J, dissenting); Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 544
(1961).
26 Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 737-38 n 8 (1979) (Powell,J, dissenting);
Vance v Bradley, 440 US 93, 113, 120 n 6 (1979) (Marshall, J, dissenting); New Motor
Vehicle Board of California v Orrin W Fox Co., 439 US 96, 125 n 28 (1978) (Stevens, J,
dissenting); Regents of University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265, 288-92, 357 (1978);
Foley v Connelie,435 US 291, 294 (1978); Nyquist v Mauclet,432 US 1, 17 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J, dissenting); Usery v Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 US 1, 24, 44 (1976); Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307, 313 (1976); Application of Griffiths, 413 US
717, 721 (1973); Sugarman v Dougall, 413 US 634, 642 (1973) (Rehnquist, J, dissenting);
San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall, J,
dissenting); United States v Caldwell, 408 US 665, 719 n 8 (1972); Graham v Richardson,
403 US 365, 372 (1971); Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 248, 295 n 14 (1970) (Harlan,
J, dissenting).
27 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review (Harvard, 1980).
2 City of Richmond v J. A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 495 (1989); New York State Club
Association, Inc. v City of New York, 487 US 1, 17 (1988); South Carolinav Baker, 485 US
505, 513 (1988); Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 844 n 1 (1987)
(Brennan, J, dissenting); Bowen v American Hospital Association, 476 US 610, 627 (1986);
Wygant v Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 US 267, 317 n 10 (1986) (Stevens, J, dissenting);
City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 471-72 (1985) (Marshall, J,
concurring and dissenting); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v Ward, 470 US 869, 881, 887,
893 (1985); Selective Service System v Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 US 841,
878 n 21 (1984) (Marshall, J, dissenting); Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 557 n 36 (1984)
(Stevens, J, concurring and dissenting); Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 793 n 16 (1983);
Crawford v Board of Education of Los Angeles, 458 US 527, 547 (1982) (Blackmun, J, concurring); Washington v Seattle School District No. 1, 458 US 457, 458, 486 (1982); Toll v
Moreno, 458 US 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J, concurring); Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 217 n
14 (1982); Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 US 264,
280 n 20, 291 (1981); Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v State Board of Equalization
of California, 451 US 648, 672-74 (1981); PennhurstState School and Hospitalv Halderman,
451 US 1, 19 (1981); Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 US 456, 464, 469, 478 n
2 (1981); Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US
607, 695 n 9 (1980) (Marshall, J, dissenting); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448
US 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J, concurring); Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 518-19
(1980) (Marshall, J, concurring); Harris v McRae, 448 US 297, 344 (1980) (Marshall, J,
dissenting); O'Bannon v Town CourtNursing Center, 447 US 773, 800 n 8 (1980) (Blackmun,
J, concurring).
29 SorrellvIMS Health Inc., 131 S Ct 2653, 2675 (2011) (Breyer,J, dissenting); McDonald
v City of Chicago, 130 S Ct 3020, 3101, 3116, 3124-25 (2010) (Stevens, J, dissenting)
(Breyer, J, dissenting); District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 628 n 27 (2008); Kelo v
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order, CaroleneProducts has come to stand for differential standards
of review applied in cases involving economic regulation, on the
one hand, and civil rights and civil liberties on the other.
This was not always the case. For Carolene Productsinvolved the
question, at the time a subject of considerable vexation, of the power
of Congress to prohibit the interstate shipment of disfavored articles
under its commerce power. In the first decade or so following its
announcement, Carolene Products was cited by the Court as a precedent concerning the scope of the commerce power" as frequently
as it was invoked either for its position on the standard of review
in cases involving ordinary commercial transactions" or for the
heightened scrutiny for civil liberties and minority rights suggested
City of New London, 545 US 469, 521-22 (2005) (Thomas, J, concurring); Vieth vfubelirer,
541 US 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J, concurring); Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702,
766 (1997) (SouterJ, concurring); United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 575 (19 96) (Scalia,
J, dissenting); Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 948 (1995) (Ginsburg, J, dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v Pena, 515 US 200, 218 (1995); United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 604,
606-07, 610 (1995) (Souter, J, dissenting); Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 326 (1993); Lucas
v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1045 (1992) (Blackmun, J, dissenting);
Gregory vAshcroft, 501 US 452, 468 (1991); Air Line PilotsAssociation, InternationalvO'Neill,
499 US 65, 75, 78 (1991); United States v Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385, 406 (1990) (Stevens,
J, concurring).
30 See Joseph v Carter &rWeekes Stevedoring Co., 330 US 422,426
(1947) ("The Commerce
Clause bears no limitation of power upon its face and, when the Congress acts under it,
interpretation has suggested none, except such as may be prescribed by the Constitution.");
Morgan v Virginia, 328 US 373, 380 (1946) ("Congress, within the limits of the Fifth
Amendment, has authority to burden commerce if that seems to it a desirable means of
accomplishing a permitted end."); Roland ElectricalCo. v Walling, 326 US 657, 669 (1946)
("The primary purpose of the [Fair Labor Standards] Act is ... to prohibit the shipment
of goods in interstate commerce if they are produced under substandard labor conditions.
Such a prohibition is an appropriate exercise of the power of Congress over interstate
commerce."); Federal Power Commission v Natural Gas Pipeline of America, 315 US 575,
582 (1942) ("The sale of natural gas originating in one State and its transportation and
delivery to distributors in any other State constitutes interstate commerce, which is subject
to regulation by Congress. . . . It is no objection to the exercise of the power of Congress
that it is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of
a State."); United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 114 (1941) ("It is no objection to the assertion
of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same
incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states."); United States v
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 US 377, 427 (1940) ("It is no objection to the terms
and to the exertion of the [commerce] power that 'its exercise is attended by the same
incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states."'). See also Apex
Hosiery Co. v Leader, 310 US 469, 484 n 2 (1940); Carolene Products Co. v United States,
323 US 18, 23, 31-32 (1944).
" Alabama State Federation of Labor v McAdory, 325 US 450, 466 (1945); Sage Stores Co.
v Kansas, 323 US 32, 35 (1944); Carolene Products Co, 323 US at 18; Yakus v United States,
321 US 414, 466, 484 (1944) (Rutledge, J, dissenting); West Virginia Board of Education v
Barnette, 319 US 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting); FederalSecurity Administrator
v Quaker Oats, 318 US 218, 229 (1943); United States v Lowden, 308 US 225, 240 (1939);
Clark v Paul Gray, Inc., 306 US 583, 594 (1939).
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by Footnote Four.32 This earlier understanding of the case was
similarly reflected in the teaching materials of the day. The 1941
edition of University of Chicago political science professor Walter
Dodd's casebook treated CaroleneProductsas an important precedent
concerning not only due process" but also the commerce power,14
and that treatment would persist through his remaining editions up
to 1954." Professor John Sholley's 1951 casebook similarly recognized Carolene Products not only for Footnote Four," but also as
a significant Commerce Clause precedent."
Today it is the exceptional casebook that includes Carolene Products in its treatment of the commerce power." Indeed, a recently
published casebook with the title American ConstitutionalStructure
does not even mention the decision." Again, given the Supreme
Court's recent treatment of the precedent, this is not surprising.
32 Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 90-91 (1949) (Frankfurter, J, concurring); United States
v Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 US 106, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J, concurring);
Everson v Board of Education of Ewing, 330 US 1, 62 n 61 (1947) (Rutledge, J, dissenting);
Thomas v Collins, 323 US 516, 530 (1945); Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 173 (1944)
(Murphy, J, dissenting); Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, CJ, concurring); American Federationof Liberty v Swing, 312 US 321, 325 (1941); MinersvilleSchool
District v Gohitis, 310 US 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J, dissenting); Thornhill v Alabama, 310
US 88, 95 (1940).
" Walter F. Dodd, Cases on ConstitutionalLaw 84 (West, 3d ed 1941).
14 Id at 613.

" Walter E Dodd, Cases and Materialson ConstitutionalLaw 87, 619 (West, 4th ed 1949);
Walter F. Dodd, Cases on ConstitutionalLaw 81, 595 (5th ed 1954).
36 John B. Sholley, Cases on ConstitutionalLaw 1035-36 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1951).
" Id at 514.
3 The following casebooks make no mention of the case in their sections on the commerce power: Choper et al, Constitutional Law; Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law; Maggs
and Smith, ConstitutionalLaw; Sullivan and Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw; Paulsen et al, The
Constitution of the United States; Massey, American Constitutional Law; Barron et al, Constitutional Law; Banks and Smolla, Constitutional Law; Araiza and Medina, Constitutional
Law; Varat, Cohen, and Amar, ConstitutionalLaw; Farber, Eskridge, Jr., and Frickey, Cases
and Materials on Constitutional Law; Nowak and Rotunda, Constitutional Law; Stone et al,
Constitutional Law; Shanor, American Constitutional Law: Structure and Reconstruction; and
Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw (all cited in note 15). The casebook that best recognizes
Carolene Products as an important Commerce Clause decision is Redlich, Attansaio, and
Goldstein, Constitutional Law at 81 (cited in note 15), which includes the case in its
discussion of Commerce Clause development. See also Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern ConstitutionalLaw 234-35 (West, 9th ed 2009) (Carolene Productsincluded in Commerce Clause
section, though focusing on due process and Footnote Four); Crump et al, Materials on
Constitutional Law at 128 (cited in note 15) (Carolene Products cited in edited version of
Katzenbach v McClung); Brest et al, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking at 523, 618
(cited in note 15) (Carolene Products cited in edited version of Justice Souter's dissent in
United States v Lopez, and in connection with Justice Stone's dormant Commerce Clause
opinion in South Carolina Highway Dept. v Barnwell Bros.).
" William Funk, Introduction to American Constitutional Structure (West, 2008).
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Since 1947, the Court has cited Carolene Products only once for a
principle of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and that lone event
is now more than three decades past.' But at the time of its decision,
CaroleneProductswas regarded as establishing an important principle
of constitutional federalism.

11.

HAMMER v DAGENHART REVISITED

A. VESTED RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS

To understand why this was so, we need to recall that Carolene
Products concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting the interstate shipment of filled milk." Prohibition of
interstate shipment of disfavored articles had become a common
technique of congressional regulation since the 1890s. In 1903,
the Court had upheld a federal statute prohibiting interstate shipment of lottery tickets.42 On the basis of this precedent, Congress
enacted the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906," which forbade
interstate transportation of adulterated or inadequately labeled
food and drugs. The Court sustained the statute by a unanimous
vote in 1910.' Encouraged by these decisions, Congress in 1916
passed the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act," which prohibited
interstate shipment of goods made by enterprises employing child

labor. But in 1918 the Court broke the string of congressional
victories, invalidating the statute by a vote of 5-4 in the case of
Hammer v Dagenhart.'
In keeping with long-standing principles of constitutional adjudication, Justice William Day's majority opinion disclaimed any

inquiry into the purpose or intent of Congress in enacting the
40 Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 US 264, 291
(1981) ("The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved
to the States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the
Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of their police powers.
. . . 'it is no objection to the exertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that
its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power
of the states."').
* Filled Milk Act, 42 Stat at 1486.
4 Champion v Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 US 321 (1903).
* Pure Food Act, 34 Stat at 768.
*Hipolite Egg Co. v United States, 220 US 45 (1910).

* Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, 39 Stat at 675.
* 247 US 251 (1918).
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statute." Nevertheless, Day maintained that "[a] statute must be
judged by its natural and reasonable effect,"" and concluded, "In
our view the necessary effect of this act is, by means of a prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary
commercial commodities to regulate the hours of labor of children
in factories and mines within the states, a purely state authority." 4 9
Congress could not regulate employment relations in manufacturing directly, and therefore could not do so through the indirection of penalizing the employer by denying him access to interstate markets.
But as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes pointed out in his dissent,
Congress had been granted expressly the power to regulate interstate commerce, and "the exercise of its otherwise constitutional
power by Congress" could not "be pronounced unconstitutional
because of its possible reaction upon the conduct of the States in
a matter upon which .

.

. they are free from direct control." 0 In

Holmes's view, "that matter had been disposed of so fully as to
leave no room for doubt."" The Court's "most conspicuous decisions" had "made it clear that the power to regulate commerce
and other constitutional powers could not be cut down or qualified
by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the
domestic policy of any State."52 For example, the Court had sustained a 10 cent per pound excise tax on the production of colored
oleomargarine notwithstanding its probable effect on the manufacture of the product." Holmes might also have observed that
the necessary effect of a prohibition on interstate shipment of
lottery tickets was to reduce the level of production of those items
within any given state; and that the necessary effect of a prohibition
on the interstate shipment of impure foods and adulterated or
mislabeled drugs was to regulate the conditions of their manufacture and production within the states in which they were pro" Id at 276 ("We have neither authority nor disposition to question the motives of
Congress in enacting this legislation."); see Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative
Purpose, 83 NYU L Rev 1784 (2008).
4 Hammer, 247 US at 275.
49

Id at 276.

so Id.
51 Id.
52

Id at 278.

"

Id.
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duced. Even though direct regulation of manufacturing and production was a power reserved to the states and thus beyond
congressional authority, indirect federal regulations of production
through the exercise of enumerated powers had been upheld repeatedly."
Justice Day therefore was obliged to draw a distinction between
the statutes upheld in the Lottery Act and Pure Food and Drugs
Law cases, on the one hand, and the Keating-Owen Child Labor
Act on the other. Day's answer was that "[i]n each of these [former]
instances the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the
accomplishment of harmful results."" Each of these items inflicted
a harm outside the state of origin. Lottery tickets corrupted morals
and contributed to penury by promoting gambling; impure food
and adulterated or mislabeled drugs posed risks to public health
and safety. By contrast, goods manufactured by companies employing child labor, Day argued, were "of themselves harmless."56
They posed no risk to the health or safety of the consumer of the
product.
The principle that emerged from Hammer v Dagenhart, then,
was that Congress could prohibit the interstate transportation of
an item, notwithstanding the significant effects that such a prohibition might have on the levels or conditions of its production
in a state, if such a prohibition was necessary to prevent a cognizable harm outside the state of origin. Interstate shipment of
harmful items could be forbidden, but such shipment of harmless
items could not. Such regulation of interstate shipment might have
the collateral effect of reducing harms in the state of manufacture,
but the redress of such harms alone was beyond federal authority,
and such harms therefore could not provide a warrant for such
exercises of the commerce power.
" See Thomas Reed Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation 64
(Columbia, 1956) ("The lottery enterprise then conducted in Louisiana was curtailed by
the Anti-Lottery Act sustained by the Lottery case. The production of impure foods was
curbed when the national Pure Food and Drug Act punished their shipment to sister
states."); Thurlow M. Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case, 32 Hary L Rev 45, 58 (1918);
Thomas Reed Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause,
3 Southern L Q 175, 182-83, 197 (1918); Thomas Reed Powell, The Child-LaborDecision,
106 The Nation 730 (June 22, 1918); Thomas I. Parkinson, CongressionalProhibitionsof
Interstate Commerce, 16 Colum L Rev 367, 377-80 (1916); Thomas I. Parkinson, The Federal
Child-Labor Law: Another View of Its Constitutionality, 31 Pol Sci Q 531, 531-32 (1916).
ss Hammer, 247 US at 271.
5"

Id at 272.
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This principle was at the time and ever since has been subjected
to derisive criticism.s" Understandably, commentators often have
depicted Hammer as inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions
upholding prohibitions on interstate shipment of lottery tickets
and adulterated or misbranded food and drugs, and some writers
have accused the Hammer majority of harboring ulterior motivations. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, after contrasting the Lottery Case with Hammer, mildly maintains that "the Court did not
consistently define the zone of activities reserved to the states,"5
and notes that "[s]ome commentators argue that there is no principled distinction between the cases; that the only distinction is
that a conservative court approved regulation of gambling, but not
regulation of businesses' employment practices." 9 Professor Laurence Tribe argues that in Hammer, "the Court departed in an
unprincipled way from its precedents and confused Commerce
Clause jurisprudence by dramatically narrowing its application.""o
The majority's attempt to distinguish the earlier decisions on the
ground that "those cases had involved federal regulation of items
whose very shipment could be harmful," Professor Tribe charges,
was "transparently unconvincing."" Another leading text characterized Hammer's distinction between harmful and harmless
goods as "an unconvincing exercise in judicial ingenuity,"62 while
Professor David Currie concluded that "[i]t is hard to believe that
" See William Carey Jones, The Child Labor Decision, 6 Cal L Rev 395, 408-11 (1918);
Gordon, 32 Harv L Rev at 48-56 (cited in note 54); Powell, 3 Southern L Q at 189-97
(cited in note 54); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Federal Child Labor Law Invalid, 27 Yale
L J 1092, 1093 (1918); Comment, Child Labor Law Case-Commerce Power of Congress and
Reserved Powers of the States, 17 Mich L Rev 83, 86-87 (1918); Henry Wolf Bikle, The
Commerce Power and Hammer v. Dagenhart,67 U Pa L Rev 21, 29-31 (1919). The criticism
continued in the 1920s, see William A. Sutherland, The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution, 8 Cornell L Q 338, 341, 343-48 (1923); and the 1930s, see Edward S. Corwin,
Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce: A Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18 Cornell L Q 477,
494-96 (1933); John Dickinson, "Defect of Power" in Constitutional Law, 9 Temple L Q
388, 395 (1934).
ss Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 249-50 (Aspen, 2d ed
2002).
' Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 117 (Aspen, 2001). Another scholar archly
surmised that "[i]t turned out that the Court was more interested in suppressing moral
deviants than economic malefactors." Lucas Scot Powe, The Supreme Court and the American
Elite 1789-2008 183 (Harvard, 2009).
60 Laurence H. Tribe, I American ConstitutionalLaw 828 n 10 (Foundation, 3d ed 2000).
61

Id.

Alfred Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Herman Belz, 2 The American Constitution:
Its Originsand Development 447 (W. W Norton, 7th ed 1991).
6'
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the majority found its own distinctions persuasive."
Such scholarly disenchantment with this principle proceeds in
no small measure, I suggest, from the fact that Justice Day presented it as a principle of federalism that could be derived from
the Commerce Clause alone. As Justice Holmes argued persuasively in dissent, it could not. But we should not conclude from
this that contemporary lawyers would have agreed that the principle could not be derived from the Constitution. For Justice Day
was characterizing as a principle of federalism what was in fact a
principle of substantive due process."
I will refine this idea as the discussion progresses, but here is
the basic structure of the underlying thought: Proper exercises of
a state's police power that protected public health, safety, or morals
did not deprive anyone of a constitutionally protected liberty or
property right without due process, because no one had a constitutionally protected right to harm the health, safety, or morals
of the public. The same was true of exercises of congressional
power prohibiting uses of the channels of interstate commerce
that inflicted harm on public health, safety, or morals. But legislation that restricted the use of lawfully acquired property without such an adequate justification grounded in the protection of
the public deprived its owner of his property without due process
of law. To be sure, an employer in North Carolina, for example,
had no constitutionally protected right to employ children-the
state legislature could prohibit child labor without violating the
Fourteenth Amendment."s But if North Carolina elected to permit
the employment of children in its factories, the employer of child
labor in that state acquired vested property rights in the product
of that labor under the law of his state. And Congress had no
power to displace that local law of property with its own law of
property. Congress could exercise its commerce power to prevent
the interstate shipment of that product if such a prohibition were
necessary to prevent harms to interstate commerce itself, or to the
inhabitants of other states, because the owner had no constitu6 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court The Second Century 1888-1986
98 (Chicago, 1990).
* See Thomas Reed Powell, ConstitutionalLaw in 1917-1918, 1, 13 Am Pol Sci Rev 47,
48 (1919) ("No fault was found with the statute under the due-process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.").
" Sturges and Burn Manufacturing Co. v Beauchamp, 231 US 320 (1913).
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tionally protected right to use his lawfully acquired property so
as to inflict such harms. As the Lottery and Pure Food and Drugs
Cases demonstrated, the fact that such a prohibition had a collateral effect on levels or conditions of production in the sending
state did not vitiate the constitutionality of the federal regulation.
But Congress could not prohibit such interstate shipment if it
were not necessary to prevent such a harm, because to do so would
be to deprive the owner of his lawfully acquired property without
due process of law. Only if the Due Process Clause were violated
would the collateral effect on production be considered problematic; and, indeed, that collateral effect was superfluous so far as
constitutional analysis was concerned, because the due process
violation alone condemned the statute. In truth, then, the restriction on congressional power to prohibit interstate shipment of
products was derived neither from the internal limitations of the
Commerce Clause, nor from whatever affirmative limitations the
Tenth Amendment might impose, but instead from the limitations
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
This view was articulated with varying degrees of clarity, awareness, and sophistication in a variety of settings well before Hammer
was decided. Examination of a controversy in the state courts may
help us to see the due process issue more clearly. In 1894, in an
effort to reduce the competition of goods made by convict labor
with those made by free laborers, the voters of New York adopted
an amendment to the state constitution adopting the "state-use"
system of convict labor. Under the terms of the amendment, the
state was forbidden to hire out the labor of its convicts to private
parties, and goods made by convicts in state institutions could be
disposed of only to the state and its political subdivisions, and not
placed on the private market. Goods produced by convicts incarcerated in the prisons of sister states continued to enter New York
markets, however, and to compete with goods made by free labor
in New York and elsewhere. In 1896 the New York legislature
responded by enacting a statute making it a misdemeanor to sell
or expose for sale goods made in any prison without attaching to
them a label disclosing them to be "convict-made," and revealing
" Thomas Reed Powell did not see the complete structure of the argument clearly, but
he did recognize that the majority's position was "built upon a due-process distinction,
and then unwarrantably transferred to the commerce clause." Powell, 3 Southern L Q at
194 (cited in note 54).
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the name of the prison in which they had been produced. The
state regime thus prohibited the sale on the private market of
convict-made goods produced in New York, and required the labeling of convict-made goods produced outside the state. A man
named Hawkins was charged with violating the statute by offering
for sale a scrub brush produced in an Ohio prison without the
label required by statute. Hawkins maintained that the statute
violated the dormant Commerce Clause and deprived him of property without due process of law. With respect to each issue, the
question was whether the New York statute constituted a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect public health,
safety, morals, and welfare."7
Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals held that
the statute was not such a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power. For the Appellate Division, Judge Putnam observed that
it had not been alleged in the indictment "that the brush was not
a good one; was not the same, in all regards, as that made by other
than convict labor."'" Nor was it "claimed to have been an inferior
or deceptive article." It was "an ordinary merchantable scrub
brush," and not an article "clearly injurious to the lives, health,
or welfare of the people.""9 Judge Dennis O'Brien's opinion for
the Court of Appeals agreed that the brush was not of inferior
quality, and observed that there was no "pretense that the act was
passed to suppress any fraudulent practice, or that any such practice existed with respect to such goods."o O'Brien therefore maintained that the statute violated both the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"The scrubbing brush in question was beyond all doubt an article
of property in which the defendant could lawfully deal," O'Brien
insisted. Yet the statute forbade him to sell it "except upon the
condition that he shall attach to it a badge of inferiority which
People v Hawkins, 51 NE 257 (NY 1898).
People v Hawkins, 47 NY Supp 56, 57 (NY App Div 1897).
69 Id at 60. An advisory opinion issued by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
on a proposed labeling statute reached the same conclusion. The bill went "beyond a
lawful exercise of the police power," the Justices agreed, because there was "nothing wrong
in the nature of things in prison-made goods." Such goods were "not unsanitary or so
inferior in quality that their sale would constitute a fraud on the public." Were there any
differences in the "grade of workmanship," they "would be as apparent without branding
as in like products made in private shops." In re Opinion of the justices, 98 NE 334, 33536 (1912).
" Hawkins, 51 NE at 258.
6
6
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diminishes the value and impairs its selling qualities."7 The statute
thus interfered with "the right to acquire, possess, and dispose of
property," and the state could not impair the value of such lawfully
acquired property "by hostile legislation without a violation of the
constitutional guaranties for the protection of property."72
Thus, the state's police power was restricted to preventing
harms occurring within its own territorial, legislative jurisdiction."
A state like New York might disagree with the policy of employing
prisoners in the production of goods, or of employing children
under the age of 16, and it was free to prohibit these activities
within its own borders. New York might also believe that the terms
and conditions of such employment in sister states inflicted upon
those so employed objectionable harms that could be and ought
to be stopped. But the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause restrained New York from seeking to prevent those harms
or to influence the prison and child-labor policies pursued in sister
states by forbidding or adversely regulating the sale of the products
of that labor, unless those products harmed the health, safety,
morals, or welfare of New York's inhabitants. And as Congressman
Steven V. White of New York maintained in reluctantly opposing
a federal bill prohibiting the interstate shipment of convict-made
goods in 1888, Congress was similarly constrained by the Fifth
Amendment from using its commerce power to prevent such employment harms inflicted outside its legislative jurisdiction, and
thereby to shape the employment policies pursued in the several
states. "The State which properly punishes its criminals can properly employ them at labor, and the product of that labor is property
of equal dignity and consideration under the Constitution with
any other product of man's labor," White argued. The bill was
7

Id.

n Id at 259-60.
" Bonaparte v Tax Court, 104 US 592, 594 (1881); Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US 578
(1897); Nielsen v Oregon, 212 US 315 (1909); Cohensv Virginia, 19 US 267, 427-28 (1821);
New York Life Insurance Co. v Head, 234 US 149, 161 (1914); Westel Woodbury Willoughby,
ConstitutionalLaw of the United States 254 (Baker Voorhis, 2d ed 1929); Donald H. Regan,
Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine; (H) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 Mich L Rev 1865, 1884-91, 1894-95,
1899-1900 (1987); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum L Rev 249, 251, 316-22, 331, 336
(1992); Willis L. M. Reese, Legislativejurisdiction, 78 Colum L Rev 1587, 1587-94 (1978);
Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896-EmbracingDue Process, 45 Am J Legal Hist 71,
87 (2001); James Y. Stern, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 Va L Rev 1509,
1514-17 (2008).
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therefore unconstitutional "because it takes lawful property from
its owner without due process of law."7 4
Many Progressive Era commentators arrived at the same assessment of congressional bills proposing to prohibit the interstate
shipment of goods made by firms employing child labor. Even
Thomas Parkinson, a professor of law at Columbia, counsel to the
National Child Labor Committee (NCLC), and an energetic defender of the Keating-Owen law, recognized that "[t]he individual
has . . . a right to seek an interstate market, and this right Congress

cannot take from him, except by due process."" In 1907, when
Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana first introduced a bill to
prohibit the interstate shipment of child-made goods, Professor
Andrew Alexander Bruce wrote in the Michigan Law Review that
under the Due Process Clause "[t]he right to liberty and property
would certainly include the continuance of the right of interstate
traffic in goods which were in themselves harmless and innocent."7 ' That same year George Talley wrote of the Beveridge bill
in the Chicago Legal News, "Since the fifth amendment was passed,
there is no question but what the commerce clause was limited to
the full extent of the amendment."7 "To restrict one man's goods
and allow the sale of others, where they are all equally innocuous,
is the deprivation of 'liberty and property.' 7 In 1917 Professor
Frederick Green wrote in the IllinoisLaw Bulletin that the KeatingOwen Law "should be held invalid as denying due process of
" 19 Cong Rec 4528 (May 22, 1888).
" Parkinson, 31 Pol Sci Q at 534 (cited in note 54). See also 41 Cong Rec 1870 (anuary
28, 1907) (remarks of Sen. McCumber). For general recognition that the commerce power
was limited by the Fifth Amendment and could not be exercised arbitrarily, see Parkinson,
31 Pol Sci Q at 532, 534, 539-40 (cited in note 54); Powell, 3 Southern L Q at 192-94,
200 (cited in note 54); Gordon, 32 Harv L Rev at 54 (cited in note 54); Bikle, 67 U Pa
L Rev at 31, 35 (cited in note 57); Jones, 6 Cal L Rev at 408 (cited in note 57); B. L.,
Comment, The Child Labor Law, 26 Yale L J 242, 244 (1916); Edgar Watkins, Is the Federal
Child Labor Statute Constitutional?23 Case & Comm 906, 910 (1917); Jasper Yeates Brinton,
The Constitutionality of a Federal Child Labor Law, 62 U Pa L Rev 487, 499-502 (1914);
Robert B. Troutman, Constitutionality of a Federal Child Labor Law, 26 Green Bag 154,
154, 158-59 (1914). See also Parkinson, 16 Colum L Rev at 380-85 (cited in note 54);
Philander C. Knox, The Development of the FederalPower to Regulate Commerce, 17 Yale L
J 139, 146-47 (1908).
76 Andrew Alexander Bruce, The Beveridge Child Labor Bill and the
United States as Parens
Patriae, 5 Mich L Rev 627, 636 (1907).
" George A. Talley, Interstate Commerce and the Police Power, 40 Chi Legal News 12,
13 (1907).
7 Id at 12.
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law."79 "To prohibit an employer to ship articles into another state
because they were made by children, is to deprive a man, who has
done nothing but what he was entitled to do, of liberty to do a
harmless, and presumably a beneficial act essential to the ordinary
use of his property and the ordinary prosecution of his business."so
That same year Professor D. 0. McGovney maintained in the
Iowa Law Bulletin that "Congress may not absolutely prohibit the
carriage in interstate commerce of innocuous commodities, being
restrained therefrom by the Fifth Amendment.""
Such criticisms also were voiced during the congressional floor
debates over the Keating-Owen Act. Representative Samuel J.
Nicholls of South Carolina charged that the bill was "unquestionably a violation of that clause of the Constitution which guarantees that no citizen can be deprived of his property without due
process of law," "because of what value would cotton goods be to
the manufacturer or to the purchaser who had purchased them
for the purpose of selling them if he had absolutely no way to
dispose of them?" 82 Nicholls reminded his colleagues of the principle that Judge O'Brien had articulated in Hawkins: "'The citizen
can not be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Any law which annihilates its value, restricts its use, or takes away
any of its essential attributes comes within the purview of this
limitation.""' The Keating-Owen bill proposed to deprive the
citizen of his property without due process by putting him "in
such a position that his property is absolutely worthless to him
because he has no way of selling and delivering same."" Cases
upholding the exclusion of articles from interstate commerce all
"rested upon the principle that the articles upon which an embargo
was laid never had the right to enter commerce or to use its
instrumentalities," explained Representative Walter Allen Watson
of Virginia." Such a principle would not permit Congress to "arbitrarily deny admission to interstate commerce of a bolt of cloth,"
" Frederick Green, The Child Labor Law and the Constitution, 1 Ill L Bulletin 3, 7 (1917).
Id at 6. See also id at 12, 23.
' D. 0. McGovney, The Webb-Kenyon Law and Beyond, 33 Iowa L Bulletin 145, 149
(1917). See also id at 149.
82 53 Cong Rec 1583 (January 26, 1916).
8 Id.
80

84

Id.

" Id at 1589.
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"sound in itself, not misbranded, of use and value, and incapable
of affecting the peace and morals of those to whom it is consigned,"
simply because it had been made by a child in North Carolina."
Asked by Senator William Borah of Idaho whether an employer
prohibited from shipping his child-made goods in interstate commerce would have a claim under the Fifth Amendment, Senator
Frank B. Brandegee of Connecticut responded, "I claim that absolutely.

...

I think the fifth amendment would protect the prop-

erty, innocent in itself, in interstate transportation against the prohibitions of this bill."" To deny such products admission to
interstate commerce, Brandegee insisted, "would be the taking of
property without compensation.""
Years after the Court decided Hammer, scholars and lawyers
would continue to translate Justice Day's confused majority opinion into the appropriate analytic idiom. As Professor William A.
Sutherland wrote in the Cornell Law Quarterly in 1923, "the real
trouble which the court had in mind" in Hammer, "which it did
not express and which has not been clearly expressed in any of
the criticisms of the decision which we have seen, was substantially
this: The statute is a regulation of interstate commerce. But the
commodity which it seeks to deny the privilege of carriage in
interstate commerce is an absolutely harmless commodity. The
statute, therefore, arbitrarily deprives the defendant of liberty and
property and is in violation of the fifth amendment."" Sutherland's
analysis was echoed by New York attorney Milward Martin in
1935: "instead of reasoning, as the Court did in the Child Labor
Case, that the power to regulate interstate commerce does not
include power to exclude harmless matter from such commerce,
it would seem more accurate to say that the delegated power to
regulate interstate commerce gives the Congress sovereign power
over such commerce, but that that power is limited by the Bill of
Rights; that the Congress may not close the channels of interstate
commerce to inherently harmless matter, because to do so would

86

Id.

" Id at 12283 (August 8, 1916).
88 Id.
81 Sutherland, 8 Cornell L Q at 343 (cited in
note 57).
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be confiscatory hence violative of the due process requirements
of the Fifth Amendment.""o
Just four years before Hammer was decided, Princeton University political science professor Edward S. Corwin published a famous article in the Michigan Law Review in which he proclaimed
that the "Doctrine of Vested Rights" was "The Basic Doctrine of
American Constitutional Law."91 That "fundamental" doctrine
treated "any law impairing vested rights, whatever its intention,"
as "void."9 2 It was that "basic doctrine," only tacit in the opinion
but ubiquitous in the contemporary legal culture, that guided the
Justices in the Hammer majority.
B.

RECONCILING THE PRECEDENTS

Before proceeding further, it is worth pausing to clarify two
points. First, the contention here is not that the Justices in the
Hammer majority and others articulating the "harmful goods" rationale were necessarily thinking explicitly in the vested rights/
due process terms that I have outlined. Had they actually expressed
themselves more clearly in those terms, there would be little need
to offer such an interpretation of their views. I contend only that
the terms that I have sketched are those in which the Justices
would best have explained what they intuited, had they thought
more clearly. That they did not so express themselves may be
attributable in part to the fact that the party challenging the Keating-Owen Act's constitutionality did not brief the case in these
terms. But as the sources that I have canvassed demonstrate, there
were several sophisticated contemporary legal thinkers who did
engage in clear and serious reflection about the doctrine, and expressed the ideas in precisely the terms that I have identified.
The second point, which I will elaborate in future work, is that
the vested rights/due process reading of Hammer enables us to
reconcile the otherwise puzzling line of cases involving federal
prohibitions on the interstate transportation of disfavored items.
Consider first the case of alcoholic beverages. There was no doubt
that, because of the threat that their use posed to public health,
9o Milward W Martin, Constitutionalityof the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 ABA J
811, 813 (1935).
" Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 12 Mich L Rev
247 (1914).

9' Id at 247, 255.
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safety, and morals, the sale of intoxicants could be prohibited without depriving their owners of any vested right protected by the
Due Process Clause.9 3 Not all states prohibited their production
and sale, however, and in 1890 the Supreme Court held that the
dry state of Iowa could not prohibit the sale of beer shipped in
from the wet state of Illinois so long as the product remained in
its "original package." While the product was still in transit, or
remained in its original package, the Court held, it remained
within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Congress, and beyond the reach of the destination state's police power.9 4 This ruling
resulted in the opening of a series of "original package saloons"
along the Illinois-Iowa and Missouri-Kansas borders, where thirsty
Hawkeyes and Jayhawks could purchase their beverages of choice
unperturbed by the meddling police powers of their native states.9 5
One reaction of Congress was to enact the Webb-Kenyon Act of
1913, which prohibited the interstate shipment of liquor into a
state where it was intended to be received, possessed, or sold in
violation of state law.96 The Supreme Court upheld the statute
against constitutional challenge in 1917, holding that, because of
its "exceptional nature," Congress could absolutely prohibit the
interstate shipment of intoxicating liquor.97 The owner of liquor
acquired in a wet state had no vested right to inflict the harm of
its sale in another state.
Similarly, there was no doubt that the sale of lottery tickets
could be prohibited by a competent legislature without impairing
any vested rights of their owners.9" By the time that Congress
enacted the Lottery Act in 1895, in fact, lotteries had been outlawed in every state of the Union except for Delaware, which
followed suit in 1897.9 When the Court decided the Lottery Case
" Mugler v

Kansas, 123 US 623 (1887); Boston Beer Co. v Massachusetts,97 US 25 (1877).

9' Leisy v Hardin, 135 US 100 (1890).

9 Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment: Temperance Reform, Legal Culture, and the Polity, 1880-1920 70-73 (North Carolina, 1995).
96 Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat
699.
" Clark Distilling Co. v Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 US 311, 325-26, 331-32
(1917).
" Stone v Mississippi, 101 US 814 (1879).
" See United States Department of Justice, The Development of the Law of Gambling:
1776-1976 87, 272-73, 311-14, 337, 396-98 (1977); John Samuel Ezell, Fortune'sMerry
Wheel: The Lottery in America 241-70 (Harvard, 1960); 26 Cong Rec 4313 (May 2, 1894)
(remarks of Sen. Gorman); id at 4314 (remarks of Sen. Hoar); 27 Cong Rec 3013 (March
1, 1895) (remarks of Mr. Broderick).
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in 1903, therefore, there was no state in the Union in which one
could acquire a vested right in a lottery ticket.co But even were
one or more states to defect from this policy consensus, the interstate shipment of a lottery ticket acquired in such a state could
inflict a harm to morals outside that state's legislative jurisdiction.
Indeed, it might inflict that harm if purchased by a person while
the ticket remained in actual interstate transit, or it might inflict
that harm while it remained in its original package and thus within
Congress's legislative jurisdiction.o' As Justice Harlan wrote for
the majority, Congress was "the only power competent" to meet
and crush "an evil of such an appalling character, carried on
through interstate commerce." 0 2 If a state could exercise its police
power so as to suppress lotteries within its own limits, asked Justice
Harlan, then "why may not Congress, invested with the power to
regulate commerce among the several States, provide that such
commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets
from one state to another?"' "As a State may, for the purpose
of guarding the morals of its own people, forbid all sales of lottery
tickets within its own limits, so Congress, for the purpose of guarding the people of the United States against the 'widespread pestilence of lotteries' and to protect the commerce which concerns
all the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from
one State to another." 0 4
Harlan recognized that the power to prohibit interstate transportation "cannot be deemed arbitrary, since it is subject to such
limitations or restrictions as are prescribed by the Constitution.
This power, therefore, may not be exercised so as to infringe any
rights secured or protected by that instrument."' But the Lottery
Act did not present such a case. For as Harlan observed, "surely
it will not be said to be a part of anyone's liberty, as recognized
by the supreme law of the land, that he shall be allowed to introduce into commerce among the States an element that will be
confessedly injurious to the public morals."0 6 "It is a kind of traffic
See Champion v Ames, 188 US at 357.
Leisy, 135 US at 100; Schollenberger v Pennsylvania, 171 US 1 (1898).
1o2 Champion, 188 US at 357-58.
1o3

Id at 356.

'

Id at 357.

30s
0

Id at 362-63.

Id at 357.
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which no one can be entitled to pursue as of right."'o Because no
one had a right to inflict such a harm, the interstate transportation
of lottery tickets could be forbidden by Congress without depriving anyone of vested rights protected by the Due Process Clause.
A similar analysis applies to the Pure Food and Drugs Act. As
one of the measure's principal supporters observed on the floor
of the Senate in 1906, "[n]early every State in the Union already
has a pure-food law or a code pertaining to the introduction of
pure food."o' But even if an outlier state permitted one to acquire
a vested right in adulterated or misbranded food or drugs, that
vested right did not entail the privilege of inflicting harm to the
health of persons outside that state's jurisdiction, nor of defrauding
such persons through deceptive labeling. Congressmen feared that
the protection of the original package doctrine would permit purveyors of such items to inflict such harms while the items remained
in the federal legislative jurisdiction and thus beyond the regulatory authority of the destination state. "[I]n the construction of
the interstate-commerce law," explained Senator Porter J. McCumber of North Dakota, "it has been declared that the term
'commerce' not only covers an article in its transit from one State
to another, but it protects and shields that article until it is sold
in original packages in the State of its consumption .

.

. the root

of the evil is planted in that territory over which the State has no
control and over which Congress has complete control-that is,
the jurisdiction over interstate commerce."" Under the original
package doctrine, adulterated or mislabeled food and drugs "may
be shipped into a State contrary to the laws of the State and may
be sold in the original unbroken packages in that State."' Accordingly, McCumber concluded, Congress alone could protect
the people of destination states from the sale of such goods within
the exclusive federal jurisdiction. "The States are helpless under
the law. Under the Constitution, as it has been construed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, these goods may go from
one State to another in unbroken packages, and it is not until the
107

Id at 358.

40 Cong Rec 1216 (January 19, 1906) (remarks of Sen. McCumber). See also id at
1415 (January 23, 1906); id at 2655 (February 19, 1906); id at 2761 (February 21, 1906);
id at 895 (January 10, 1906) (remarks of Sen. Heyburn).
40 Cong Rec 1416 (January 23, 1906) (remarks of Sen. McCumber).
n' Id at 1217 (January 19, 1906).
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package is broken that the jurisdiction of the State attaches." It
was therefore imperative that Congress "afford relief against the
impositions that come from one State to another.""' The owners
of such goods had no vested rights to inflict such impositions, and
only Congress could prevent such harms within its own exclusive
legislative jurisdiction.
The vested rights/due process account of the doctrine also explains decisions upholding federal statutes prohibiting the interstate transportation of goods acquired in violation of the law of
the state of origin. For example, the Lacey Act,112 which was upheld by the Eighth Circuit in Rupert v United States,"' prohibited
the interstate shipment of game taken in violation of the law of
the state in which the poaching took place. Congressional prohibition of such interstate shipment did not deprive the possessor
of the game of any vested right protected by the Due Process
Clause, because the manner in which he had taken the game prevented him from acquiring any property in it. As the court put it,
"[t]he individual having no ownership in the game ... it does not

become the general subject of commerce free from all inhibitions."'1" Similarly, the Connally Act,11 s which was repeatedly upheld by the Fifth Circuit"' and assumed to be valid by the Supreme
Court of the United States,"' prohibited the interstate transportation of "hot oil," that is, petroleum "produced or withdrawn
". Id at 1417 (January 23, 1906). See also id at 1216 (January 19, 1906); id at 895
(January 10, 1906) (remarks of Sen. Heyburn); id at 2656, 2657 (February 19, 1906)
(remarks of Sen. Money); C. C. Regier, The Strugglefor FederalFood and Drugs Legislation,
1 L & Contemp Probs 3, 5 (1933). Whether the principle of Leisy in fact extended to the
articles regulated by the bill was a matter of debate in the House, see 40 Cong Rec 904951 (June 23, 1906) (remarks of Mr. Bartlett), and the Senate, see id at 2758-67 (February
21, 1906) (remarks of Sen. Bailey); but the bill ultimately passed the House by a vote of
241-17, id at 9075-76 (June 23, 1906), and the Senate by a similarly lopsided vote of 634, id at 2773 (February 21, 1906).
112An Act to Enlarge the Powers of the Department of Agriculture, Prohibit the Transportation by Interstate Commerce of Game Killed in Violation of Local Laws, and for
Other Purposes ("Lacey Act"), 31 Stat 187 (1900).
181 F 87 (8th Cir 1910).
114 Id at 90.
us An Act to Regulate Interstate and Foreign Commerce in Petroleum and Its Products
by Prohibiting the Shipment in Such Commerce of Petroleum and Its Products Produced
in Violation of State Law, and for Other Purposes ("Connally Act"), 49 Stat 30 (1935).
"' The Presidentof the United States v Skeen, 118 F2d 58 (5th Cir 1941); Hurley v Federal
Tender Board No. 1, 108 F2d 574 (5th Cir 1939); Griswold v The President of the United
States, 82 F2d 922 (5th Cir 1936).
"' United States v Powers, 307 US 214 (1939).

346

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

from storage in excess of the amount permitted .

[2012
.

. by any State

law." The law of the state of Texas, the primary site of the wildcat
drilling at which the law was aimed, made such oil contraband,
prohibited its acquisition, purchase, sale, or transportation, and
made all such unlawful oil forfeit to the state.' Because the producer of such petroleum had taken possession of the oil in violation
of state law and had acquired no right to alienate the product
under applicable state law, the prohibition on interstate shipment
did not deprive him of any vested right protected by the Due
Process Clause.
Finally, the vested rights/due process account also reconciles
the Court's decision in Brooks v United States,"' which upheld the
Dyer Act of 1919.120 That statute made it a federal crime to transport or cause to be transported in interstate commerce "a motor
vehicle, knowing the same to be stolen." Chief Justice Taft's opinion for a unanimous bench brusquely rejected the constitutional
challenge to the act, characterizing the interstate transportation
of stolen cars as "a gross misuse of interstate commerce.21 "Conc
gress can certainly regulate interstate commerce," Taft insisted,
"to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the
spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States from the

State of origin."l 2 2
The contrast between Brooks and Hammer has long perplexed
legal commentators. Professor Robert Post, for example, finds inadequate Taft's effort to distinguish the Dyer Act from the Child
Labor Law on the ground that the latter was "really not a regulation of interstate commerce"12 ' but instead was "'a congressional
attempt to regulate labor in the State of origin, by an embargo
on its external trade,' banning from interstate commerce goods
that 'were harmless, and could be properly transported without
injuring any person who either bought or used them."I 2 4 As Pro" See Griswold, 82 F2d at 923-24.
"' 267 US 432 (1925).
12o

National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 41 Stat 324.

Brooks, 267 US at 439.
Id at 436.
121 Id at 438.
21

122

124Robert C. Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be Revived? 51 Duke L J
1513, 1575 (2002), quoting Brooks, 267 US at 438.
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fessor Post observes, "a similar characterization could be applied
to the [Dyer Act], which was a congressional effort to regulate
theft in the state of origin by banning from interstate commerce
vehicles that were harmless in themselves."' 2 5 The Dyer Act "was
not," as Taft suggested, "meant to prevent 'the spread of any evil
or harm to the people of other States from the State of origin,"'
Professor Post maintains, but instead, like the Child Labor Law,
was designed "to prevent harms within the state of origin."' Similarly, Professor David Currie noted that Chief Justice Taft "made
no effort to show that stolen cars were harmful to anyone in the
state to which they were transported. He thus left Hammer dangling without visible support and exposed the Court to a serious
charge of inconsistency."l 2 7 Professor Paul Murphy scored Brooks
as another example of "constitutional inconsistency," and criticized
the Court for "ignoring the obvious similarity between the measure and the first Child Labor Law," both of which prohibited
interstate transportation of "things not in themselves harmful."' 2 8
Professors Melvin Urofsky and Paul Finkelman likewise observe
that the Dyer Act "bore a striking resemblance to the Child Labor
Law, which had also prohibited the movement of things that were
not in themselves harmful." The contrast between the outcomes
in the two cases suggests to these scholars that "[f]ederal authority
could thus be extended without regard to legal fine points to
achieve a socially desirable end, provided the courts approved of
the goal; if they did not, then legal fine points could become
significant limits on state and federal power." 2 9
These scholars understandably express frustration with the failure of the Court's opinion to do a satisfactory job both of distinguishing Hammer and of identifying an extraterritorial harm inflicted by interstate auto theft. A private memorandum located in
125

Post, 51 Duke L J at 1575 (cited in note 124).

"' Id n 222, quoting Brooks, 267 US at 436.
127 Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court at 176 (cited in note 63).
Professor
Currie nevertheless recognized that "there may be more to Brooks than a mere judicial
conviction that car theft is worse than child labor," noting that the Dyer Act reinforced
state policy rather than undermining state autonomy. Id. Professor Currie also suggested
that Taft might have argued "that buyers in the receiving state would be injured by the
possibility of having to return the vehicles to their rightful owners without compensation,
but he did not." Id n 34.
2s Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times 1918-1969 61-62 (Harper, 1972).
"' Melvin I. Urofsky and Paul Finkelman, 2 A March of Liberty: A ConstitutionalHistory
of the United States 705 (Oxford, 3d ed 2011).
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Taft's papers at the Library of Congress shows him grappling with
the issue more frankly than he did in the published opinion. "If
the result of interstate transportation will be to spread some harmful matter or product," Taft wrote, "Congress may interfere without violating the Tenth Amendment. The facilities of interstate
commerce may be withdrawn from those who are using it to corrupt others physically or morally. But if the transportation is being
used to transport something harmless in itself and not calculated
to spread evil, like cotton cloth, Congress may not prohibit its
interstate transportation, although its inception may have been in
some evil which is the legitimate object of the police power, such
as child labor." Taft next proceeded to distinguish earlier precedents from Hammer on this basis. "[T]he interstate carriage of
lottery tickets will communicate the gambling fever, of obscene
literature will communicate moral degeneracy, of impure food will
endanger health, [and] of diseased cattle will infect local cattle.
. . ." In each of these instances, interstate transportation of the
item inflicted a harm outside the state of origin. The "justification"
for the doctrine, Taft concluded, "must be that Congress can prohibit the interstate spread of an evil thing, although it cannot
prohibit the spread of something harmless in itself in order to
suppress an evil which is properly the object of state police regulation.""'
Taft then confronted the question of the doctrine's application
to the Dyer Act. "At first I had a little difficulty with stolen automobiles," he confessed, "as the chief evil in connection therewith
is the stealing and that of course is over before the machine takes
on its character as a stolen automobile. This makes it look something like Hammer v. Dagenhart." But the ChiefJustice had gotten
over that concern, he explained, for "a stolen automobile is a
canker. It attracts shady and disreputable individuals and leads to
secret and underhanded dealings. Certainly it is not ultra vires for
Congress to prohibit the interstate communication of this canker."131
For whatever reasons, these colorful meditations on the similarities between a stolen car and an open sore did not find their
way into the Court's published opinion. But a moment's reflection
no Brooks v. United States, in Reel 614 William Howard Taft Papers 6-7 (Library of
Congress).
1' Id at 7.
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on the analogy to the Lacey Act might have enabled Taft to see
that the distinction he was groping for was grounded in due process. Just as the poacher acquired no "ownership" in game taken
in violation of state law, so neither did one who stole a motor
vehicle or knowingly took from the thief acquire any vested right
in the pilfered automobile."' Congressional prohibition of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle therefore did not deprive
anyone of a property right protected by the Due Process Clause.
Indeed, as Taft pointed out in his opinion, the Dyer Act properly
punished the interstate transportation of stolen cars "because of
its harmful result and its defeat of the property rights of those
whose machines against their will are taken into other jurisdictions."'" Rather than impairing vested rights, the Dyer Act protected them.
Each of these cases, therefore, presented two analytic questions.
First, did the party prohibited from transporting the item have a
vested property right in the thing to be transported? and, second,
would that transportation inflict a cognizable harm outside the
state of origin? If the answer to the first question were negative,
prohibition of the item's interstate shipment would be constitutionally unproblematic, for it would not deprive anyone of property without due process. And the same would be true if the answer
to the second question were affirmative, for no one had a due
process right to use his property in a manner that would be harmful
to others. The inquiry into whether a particular good was harmful
or harmless was merely a way of formulating the second question.
But a fixation on that inquiry could obscure the fact that the first
question was analytically anterior.
C. DUE PROCESS AND COMPETITIVE INJURY

The critical question in Hammer, then, was whether the interstate shipment of a child-made good in which an owner had acquired a vested right under the law of his state inflicted a cognizable harm outside the legislative jurisdiction of that state. Here
again, the convict-made goods analogy is illuminating. In his dissenting opinion in Hawkins, Judge Edward T. Bartlett insisted for
himself and Judges Albert Haight and Alton B. Parker that convictSee Jesse Dukeminier et al, Property 162 (Aspen, 7th ed 2010).
us Brooks, 267 US at 439.
132
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made goods were not harmless or innocuous, and that their unrestricted sale in New York did in fact inflict a harm on its inhabitants. The labeling requirement, he maintained, constituted
a legitimate exercise of the police power "to promote the public
welfare and prosperity" by implementing "the deliberate policy of
this state that free labor shall be protected from disastrous competition with the convict system, which pays to the workman no
wages, and therefore finds little difficulty in supplanting the wage
earner in the public markets.""' Similarly, in Hammer, government
attorneys insisted that interstate shipment of goods made by employers of child labor, like the interstate shipment of lottery tickets,
impure food, and misbranded drugs, was in fact harmful to the
inhabitants of destination states."'s They argued that interstate
shipment of goods made by cheap child labor created "unfair competition""' with competing manufacturers in states where child
labor had been "more rigorously restrained.""' Part of the underlying concern was that this competition would create pressure
for the more child-protective states to lower their standards, resulting in harm to their juvenile populations."' As the appellant
argued, "[t]here is no right to use the channels of interstate commerce to affect injuriously the health of the people in competing
states . . . nor in unfair competition."139 And because such a competitive harm might result from the sale of the good in its original
package, the harm was inflicted in the federal legislative jurisdiction. Indeed, the dormant Commerce Clause prevented a destination state from regulating the sale of out-of-state child-made
goods still in their original packages,' and destination states typically would have no reliable way of determining which goods
within their borders had been produced elsewhere by children."
Hawkins, 51 NE at 263.
" Brief for Appellant, Hammer v Dagenhart, No 704, *41-42, 44 (US filed Sept 26,
1917) ("Hammer Brief").
136 Hammer, 247 US at 254, 258, 273; Hammer
Brief at *16-21, 45-48.
13' Hammer, 247 US
at 273.
1

"1 Id at 254; Hammer Brief at *23-36, 40; Gordon, 32 Harv L Rev at 55 (cited in note
54).
"' Hammer Brief at *38. See also 53 Cong Rec 1585 (January 26, 1916) (remarks of
Mr. Lenroot); id at 2011 (February 2, 1916) (remarks of Mr. Reavis).
" See Leisy, 135 US at 100; Schollenberger, 171 US 1; 53 Cong Rec App 227 (January
26, 1916) (extension of remarks of Mr. Keating).
14 53 Cong Rec App 227 (January 26, 1916) (extension of remarks of Mr. Keating).
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The federal government was therefore the only sovereign with
effective legislative jurisdiction to prevent the child labor policies
of one state from inflicting competitive harm in a neighboring
state through the medium of interstate shipment.142
Judge O'Brien rejected this argument from competitive harm
in Hawkins, insisting that the state could not exercise its police
power "to enhance the price of labor by suppressing, through the
instrumentality of the criminal law, the sale of the products of
prison labor."14 And that principle, as the court would reaffirm a
dozen years later, applied equally where the goods in question had
lost their character as interstate commerce and become part of
the general merchandise of the state, so that the dormant Commerce Clause was no longer implicated. Phillipsv Raynes" involved
a subsequently enacted New York statute requiring anyone displaying convict-made goods for sale to pay an annual license fee
of 500 dollars. The Raynes court observed that the "obvious purpose" of the statute, "writ so plain that all may read," was "to
prohibit by onerous and exasperating restrictions .

.

. the buying

and selling within this state of convict-made goods." But setting
this aside and treating the statute "purely as a revenue or tax law,"
the court found that its classification was "unreasonable and capricious." "That classification is based upon the origin of the goods
dealt in, without regard to the quality or character or nature of
the goods themselves." "If such classification be valid," the judges
reasoned, "and if the purpose of the act, as is claimed, is to protect
free labor from prison labor, why in these days of contest between
organized and unorganized labor should not an act be passed which
provided for such a license for selling all goods made in a shop
which did not employ union labor, and then, if the advocates of
a free shop were in power, repeal it, and provide for such license
for all goods made in shops which employed union labor.""' As
142

Id.

14Hawkins, 51 NE at 258.
1 i20 NY Supp 1053, 1056-57 (NY App Div 1910), aff'd per curiam 92 NE 1097
(NY 1910).
"' Id at 1057-58. Justice Harlan had made clear only two years earlier that such a
discrimination between union and nonunion labor violated the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Adair v United States, 208 US 161, 169, 179-80 (1908). See also Ernst
Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and ConstitutionalRights 752-5 3 (Callaghan, 1904);
Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 BU L Rev 881, 926-28
(2005).
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Judge O'Brien concluded in Hawkins, "One state may have natural
advantages for the production of certain goods by reason of location, climate, or the rate of wages over another state where it
costs more to produce them, but the latter cannot by hostile legislation drive the cheaper-made goods out of its markets, even
though such legislation would increase the wages of its own workmen."146
Justice Day similarly rejected the notion that such "possible
unfair competition" was a harm that Congress was empowered to
prevent.4 4 Echoing O'Brien's opinion in Hawkins, Day observed
that "[m]any causes may co-operate to give one state, by reason
of local laws or conditions, an economic advantage over others."1 48
But "[t]he commerce clause was not intended to give to Congress
a general authority to equalize such conditions."1 49 For example,
"[iln some of the states laws have been passed fixing minimum
wages for women, in others the local law regulates the hours of
labor of women in various employments. Business done in such
states may be at an economic disadvantage when compared with
states which have no such regulations; surely, this fact does not
give Congress the power to deny transportation in interstate commerce to those who carry on business where the hours of labor
and the rate of compensation for women have not been fixed by
a standard in use in other states and approved by Congress. "150
The difficulty in Hammer, therefore, was in the Court's broad
construction of the Fifth Amendment limitation on the exercise
of the commerce power. Such unfair competition resulting from
different labor standards was not a cognizable harm authorizing
federal restriction of lawfully acquired property rights. The story
of the demise of Hammer is thus the story of the relaxation of this
146

Hawkins, 51 NE at 261-62.

' Hammer, 247 US at 273.
148

Id.

149

Id.

Id. This view was anticipated by Professor Bruce in 1907: "[I]f we once establish the
precedent and grant to Congress the unlimited right to destroy commerce, not as a punishment for crime, or because the thing transported is injurious, but because it enters into
competition with other articles, or its method of manufacture, is not approved by the
majority in Congress, we place in the hands of the national legislature a power which may
prove absolutely subversive of individual liberty and of that freedom of commerce which
the Constitution was, above all other things, created to preserve." Bruce, 5 Mich L Rev
at 638 (cited in note 76).
50
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Fifth Amendment limitation. And it is to that story that the Carolene Products case made a signal contribution.
III.

CAROLENE PRODUCTS IN CONGRESS

Filled milk, or compound milk, as its producers preferred
to call it,'s was a form of condensed or evaporated skimmed milk,
with the removed butterfat replaced by vegetable or coconut oil.1 52
The resulting product was indistinguishable in taste, odor, color,
and consistency from condensed whole milk, and the difference
could be detected only by expert chemical analysis."' The extracted butterfat could be sold for approximately 36 cents per
pound, while coconut oil cost only about 12 cents per pound."'
As a result, filled milk could be sold at a unit price considerably
below that of name-brand condensed or evaporated milk such as
Borden's Eagle brand."s Dairy farmers resented this competition
from what they denounced as "the Coconut Cow of the South
Seas Islands,"' 6 and sought relief from state legislators. By 1921,
eleven states, mostly in the north and west, had enacted legislation
prohibiting or regulating the production and sale of filled milk,"'
s' Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Supreme Court Review
397, 398 n 10 (1987).
52 Filled-Milk Legislation, HR Rep No 67-355, 67th Cong, 1st Sess 1-2 (1921); Filled
Milk, Hearings on H.R. 6215 Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 67th Cong,
1st Sess 112 (1921) ("House Hearings"); Filled Milk, Hearings on H.R. 8086 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 67th Cong, 2d Sess
2 (1922) ("Senate Hearings"); Brief for the Carolene Products Co., United Statesv Carolene
Products, No 604, *68 (US filed Feb 28, 1938) ("Carolene Brief").
HR Rep No 67-355 at 2 (cited in note 152); Carolene Brief at *7; see also House
.s.
Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 40-41 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong,
1st Sess at 2 (cited in note 152).
154 62 Cong Rec 7608 (May 24, 1922) (remarks of Mr. Gernerd); see also House Hearings, 67th Cong, lst Sess at 87-88 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st
Sess at 5 (cited in note 152).
"s HR Rep No 67-355 at 2 (cited in note 152); Filled Milk Legislation, S Rep No 67987, 67th Cong, 4th Sess 3 (1923); Carolene Brief at *7. See also House Hearings, 67th
Cong, lst Sess at 12, 87-88, 121 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st
Sess at 2 (cited in note 152).
"5'Letter from Paul McKee of the Carnation Milk Products Company to Rep. James
B. Aswell, dated April 22, 1922, reprinted at 62 Cong Rec 7584 (May 24, 1922). See also
HR Rep No 67-355 at 4 (cited in note 152); House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 3739 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, Ist Sess at 3-5, 241-49 (cited in note
152).
"' HR Rep No 67-355 at 6 (cited in note 152); S Rep No 67-987 at 6 (cited in note
155) ("Eleven States now have laws either prohibiting entirely the manufacture and sale
of filled milk or restricting the business in such a way as to make the commercial ex-
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but competition persisted in unregulated markets. So in 1921 a
bill to prohibit the interstate shipment of filled milk was introduced in the House of Representatives by Republican Edward
Voigt, who perhaps coincidentally represented the good people in
and around Sheboygan, Wisconsin."ss
In the committee hearings and floor debates over the bill, discussion focused on precisely the considerations that would inform
an adjudication of whether comparable state legislation was a
proper exercise of the police power and therefore consistent with
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Proponents of the bill argued that filled milk was a fraudulent, counterfeit substance palmed off on an unsuspecting public as the genuine article.' 59 And though the bill's backers conceded that filled
milk was in itself neither unwholesome nor poisonous,"o they
contended that it was nevertheless deleterious to health.' The
vitamin A in butterfat, which was entirely absent from coconut
oil, was vital to proper physical development in infants, and its
insufficiency in their diet exposed them to a significant risk of
rickets, scurvy, beriberi, and diseases of the eye.162 Opponents of
the bill denounced it as "flagrant," "vicious" special interest legislation, designed to destroy a legitimate business for the benefit
ploitation impossible. These States are: Utah, Maryland, Florida, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Oregon, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin."); 62 Cong Rec 7583
(May 24, 1922).
"s 61 Cong Rec 4691 (August 4, 1921). The bill also prohibited manufacture of filled
milk in the District of Columbia, the Territories, and the insular possessions, and forbade
its shipment in foreign commerce. HR Rep No 67-355 at 1 (cited in note 152). The Pure
Food and Drugs Act of 1906 did not apply to the interstate shipment of filled milk because
of a proviso stating that an article would not be considered adulterated or misbranded if
it was a compound of ingredients offered for sale under its own name and not a imitation
of another article. Pure Food Act, 34 Stat at 771; Miller, 1987 Supreme Court Review at
406 (cited in note 151). The bill was originally introduced as an amendment to the Pure
Food and Drugs Act, see 62 Cong Rec 7581 (May 24, 1922) (remarks of Mr. Voigt), but
was reported out of committee as free-standing legislation.
" See HR Rep No 67-355 at 2 (cited in note 152); S Rep No 67-987 at 4 (cited in
note 155); House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 11-13, 15, 40 (cited in note 152);
Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 2 (cited in note 152).
..
o See House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 15 (cited in note 152) (Mr. Voigt); Senate
Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 2 (cited in note 152).
"' S Rep No 67-987 at 5, 7 (cited in note 155); House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess
at 34-35 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, Ist Sess at 2 (cited in note
152).
162 See HR Rep No 67-355 at 3-4 (cited in note 152); S Rep
No 67-987 at 3-4 (cited
in note 155); House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 10, 15 (cited in note 152); Senate
Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 6 (cited in note 152).
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of a grasping competitor and at the expense of the consumer.' 3
They asserted that the skimmed milk in filled milk contained significant amounts of vitamin A, though not as much as in whole
milk.' 4 Moreover, there were a great many foods that were lacking
in vitamin A or improper for infant consumption-turnip greens
seems to have been the favored example"'-but that this did not
authorize Congress to prohibit their interstate shipment."' And
they observed that the labels placed on cans of filled milk by their
producers prominently revealed their contents, recommended that
the product be used for cooking and baking, and explicitly stated
that it was not to be used in place of milk for infants.' 7 Proponents
responded that consumers often did not read the labels;' 8 that
retailers displayed filled milk next to condensed milk and represented it as "the same as" or "as good as" condensed milk;'6 9 that
the less expensive product was often purchased by poor, unlettered,
or immigrant consumers;"' and that the patrons of restaurants,
hotels, and boarding houses might unknowingly be served the
' 62 Cong Rec 7583-84 (May 24, 1922); see also HR Rep No 67-355 at 2 (cited in
note 152); House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 98 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st Sess at 62-65 (cited in note 152). Accord, Miller, 1987 Supreme Court
Review at 398-99 (cited in note 151) (denouncing the statute as "an utterly unprincipled
example of special interest legislation," and the justifications offered for its enactment as
"patently bogus." Its consequence "was to expropriate the property of a lawful and beneficial industry; to deprive working and poor people of a healthful, nutritious, and lowcost food; and to impair the health of the nation's children by encouraging the use as
baby food of a sweetened condensed milk product that was 42 percent sugar."); id at 416.
4 See, for example, 62 Cong Rec 7585 (May 24, 1922) (remarks of Mr. Aswell).
16

Id at 7609 (remarks of Mr. Sisson); id at 7614 (remarks of Mr. Echols).

'6 62 Cong Rec 7614 (May 24, 1922) (remarks of Mr. Echols). See also Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st Sess at 87 (cited in note 152).
' HR Rep No 67-355 at 7 (cited in note 152) (Minority Views ofJ. B. Aswell); House
Hearings, 67th Cong, Ist Sess at 39 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st
Sess at 85 (cited in note 152). See Miller, 1987 Supreme Court Review at 406, 420-21
(cited in note 151).
1' See House Hearings, 67th Cong, Ist Sess at 19 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st Sess at 6 (cited in note 152); 62 Cong Rec 7582 (May 24, 1922) (remarks
of Mr. Voigt); id at 7588 (remarks of Mr. Haugen); id at 7593 (remarks of Mr. Clarke of
New York).
'9 See HR Rep No 67-355 at 2 (cited in note 152); S Rep No 67-987 at 3 (cited in
note 155); House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 12 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st Sess at 2 (cited in note 152).
1o See HR Rep No 67-355 at 2-3 (cited in note 152); House Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st
Sess at 10, 33-34, 41-42, 49, 50, 154 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong,
1st Sess at 2, 6, 9, 14, 16, 19, 26, 44, 46, 50 (cited in note 152); 62 Cong Rec 7582, 7588,
7590, 7590-91, 7592-92, 7596, 7609 (May 24, 1922).
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product without ever seeing the label."' In the end the bill was
passed in the House by a vote of 250-40,172 and in the Senate by
a voice vote."
The hearings on the bill were dominated by farmers, manufacturers, and nutritionists, and did not elicit much in the way of
constitutional discussion. 174 Nevertheless, the report of the House
Committee on Agriculture included a discussion of the bill's constitutionality insisting that there was "nothing new in the proposal
that milk products not containing a certain amount of butter fat
shall not be transported or sold in interstate or intrastate commerce." Under the Pure Food and Drugs Act, milk and condensed
milk could not be shipped in interstate commerce unless they
contained a certain percentage of butterfat, and it was certainly
"proper to insist upon the same standard in an imitation or substitute article." That act had barred from interstate commerce
many drugs and articles of food that did not comply with certain
standards, just as Congress had barred obscene literature and lottery tickets.' The committee relied upon the precedents upholding the Lottery Act and the Pure Food and Drugs Act for
the proposition that exercises of the commerce power "may have
the quality of police regulations," and that the commerce power
could be used to "to protect the public morals," "the public
health," and "the economic welfare of the people." Congress had
"full power to bar from the channels" of interstate commerce
"illicit and harmful articles," and could "itself determine means
appropriate to this purpose." So long as those means did "no
violence to the other provisions of the Constitution," Congress
17 See S Rep No 67-987 at 3 (cited in note 155); House Hearings, 67th Cong, Ist Sess
at 10, 41 (cited in note 152); Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 6, 46 (cited in note
152).
172 62 Cong Rec 7669-70 (May 25, 1922). One member
voted "present" and 140 did
not vote.
' 64 Cong Rec 4986 (March 1, 1923). The House agreed to the Senate amendments
and the enrolled bill was signed in the House on March 2, 1923. Id at 5075, 5241 (March
2, 1923). It was presented to the president for his approval and signed by the president
the following day. Id at 5554, 5556 (March 3, 1923).
174 See S Rep No 67-987 at 6 (cited in note 155) ("The question of constitutionality
was not seriously pressed before the committee."). The exception came in the testimony
J. Wallace Bryan offered in support of the bill's constitutionality at the end of the Senate
hearing, and in Mr. Jackman's response. See Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, Ist Sess at 27781 (cited in note 152).
"' HR Rep No 67-355 at 5 (cited in note 152).
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was "itself the judge of the means to be employed.""' The only
other provision of the Constitution to which the bill might do
violence was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and just a few years earlier the Supreme Court had held that
prohibition of the sale of filled milk did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The litigation from which this holding emerged had arisen in
central Ohio. A series of statutes enacted in the late nineteenth
century, well before filled milk had been invented, prohibited the
manufacture and sale of condensed skimmed milk."' Hebe, the
brand name of Carnation's filled milk, was of course a species of
condensed skimmed milk, and the Ohio attorney general rendered
an opinion that its sale in the state violated the Ohio General
Code. 9 The Chief of the Division of Dairy and Food of the State
Board of Agriculture thereupon informed the company and those
selling its product that, unless further sales of Hebe in the state
were discontinued, prosecutions would follow and the penalties
provided for by statute would be inflicted on all who should fail
to desist.'s Hebe responded by seeking injunctive relief against
enforcement of the pertinent sections of the code by the state's
officers on the ground that those provisions were unconstitutional.'' The state did not contend that the product, nor that
either of its ingredients, was impure or unwholesome.' 82 Instead
Ohio maintained that Hebe was "regarded by a large percentage
of the public as genuine condensed [whole] milk, whereby the
public is misled and deceived into its purchase and use.""' Hebe
countered that its product was "pure, wholesome, and nutritious,"
and "plainly and fairly labeled in a conspicuous manner.""' The
" Id at 5-6. The report of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry similarly
relied on the Lottery Act and Pure Food and Drugs Act precedents in concluding, "[w]e
are thoroughly satisfied that Congress has the power to exclude from interstate and foreign
commerce any article which is in the exercise of fair judgment injurious to the public
health." S Rep 67-987 at 6 (cited in note 155).
17 HR Rep No 67-355 at 5-6 (cited in
note 152).
"' Hebe Co. v Calvert, 246 F 711, 715-16 (SD Ohio, 1917).
"' Id at 713.
180

Id at 712, 714.

181

Id at 714.

182

Id.

"' Id at 713-14. See also Brief and Argument for Appellees, Hebe Co. v Shaw, No 664,
*24-39 (US filed Dec 6, 1919) ("Shaw Brief").
1' Hebe Co., 246 F at 714-15.
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prohibition of its sale therefore deprived the company of liberty
and property without due process of law and denied it equal protection of the laws by "arbitrarily, unjustly, unduly, and in a confiscatory manner" discriminating against it.'

The case was argued on behalf of Hebe before a three-judge
panel of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio by Augustus T. Seymour of the Columbus firm of Vorys,
Sater, Seymour and Pease." 6 The opinion ruling against Hebe was
written by Seymour's former law partner, Judge John Elbert
Sater,"' and delivered in November of 1917, just months after the
United States had declared war on Germany. Judge Sater observed
that there was "a conflict in the evidence" as to whether Hebe
was "as nutritious and as effective as a growth producer, and therefore as a health promoter and maintainer, as the legally recognized
condensed [whole] milk." As long as that question was "debatable,"
the legislature was "entitled to its own judgment," which could
not be "superseded by the court." "With the wisdom of the exercise
of that judgment," Sater maintained, "the court has no concern;
and, unless it clearly appears that the enactments have no substantial relation. to a proper purpose, it cannot be said that the
limit of legislative power has been transcended.""
By contrast, there was "substantial and uncontradicted evidence"
of deception of consumers in the sale of Hebe.1 89 The difference
between the prices at which condensed milk and filled milk could
be manufactured and sold was such "that the temptation to impose
upon the public" had been "too great to be resisted.""'o It mattered
not whether the company intended to deceive the public, nor that
it had instructed its representatives to sell the product "for what
it really is," nor that the label informed the consumer of its con"' Id at 715. See also Brief and Argument for Appellants, Hebe Co. v Shaw, No 664,
*56-71 (US filed Nov 23, 1918) ("Hebe Brief").
116 Hebe Co., 246
F at 712.
'"' Id at 713; J. E Laning, ed, The New FederalJudge: Hon. John E. Sater, 52 Ohio L
Bulletin 197 (1907).
"' Hebe Co., 246 F at 717. An earlier decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
had assumed that a prohibition on the sale of condensed skimmed milk unless packaged
and labeled as required by statute was a legitimate health measure. See Reiter v State, 71
A 975, 977 (Md Ct App 1909).

'9 Hebe Co., 246 F at 717.
190

Id.
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tents."' Filled milk did not differ in appearance or taste from
condensed whole milk, and the "unwary consumer" could not be
blamed for failing to scrutinize the label closely, particularly when
an unscrupulous retailer presented it as condensed whole milk.192
The company manufactured a product that was capable of and
was in fact being "used as an instrument of fraud."' 93 The Constitution of the United States did not "secure to anyone the privilege of manufacturing and selling an article offered in such a
manner as to induce purchasers to believe they are buying something which is in fact different from that which is offered for
sale."' 94 The statute's effort "to promote fair dealing" and to "prevent the sale of an adulterated or deceptive article" therefore did
not "contravene any provision of the federal Constitution.""
The company soon brought a bill in equity, again in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, to restrain
threatened prosecutions for violation of the Ohio statutes.'9 6 The
district judge adopted Judge Sater's opinion as his own and dismissed the bill.'" Hebe appealed that ruling to the Supreme Court
of the United States, where the company was represented by former Associate Justice Charles Evans Hughes.'9 8 Justice Holmes
wrote the opinion for a 6-3 majority affirming the judgment of
the District Court.'99 The addition of coconut oil to condensed
skimmed milk, Holmes observed, made "the cheaper and forbidden substance more like the dearer and better one and thus at the
same time more available for a fraudulent substitute."2 00 It was
true that the label on the company's product was truthful, "but
the consumer in many cases never sees it.""' Applying a very
deferential standard of review, Holmes concluded that the Ohio
statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. "The purposes
..
1 Id at 717-18.
192

Id.

'9

Id.

19' Id at 718.
195
196

19

Id.
See Hebe Co. v Shaw, 248 US 297, 301 (1919).
Id.

9 Id at 298.

'

Id at 301.

200

Id at 303.
Id.

201
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to secure a certain minimum of nutritive elements and to prevent
fraud may be carried out in this way even though condensed
skimmed milk and Hebe both should be admitted to be wholesome." 202
Justice Day, the author of Hammer, subjected the statute to more
searching scrutiny in a dissenting opinion written on behalf of
himself, Justice Willis Van Devanter, and Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Day asserted that Hebe made "no pretense" to being condensed whole milk. Its label disclosed "in unmistakable words in
large print" that it was "a food compound consisting in part of
condensed skimmed milk." "The label states with all the emphasis
which large type can give that it is a compound made of 'evaporated skimmed milk and vegetable fat,"' Day observed. "The
proportions of the ingredients" were "stated" on the "striking label," which did not "describe condensed milk, and he who reads
it cannot be misled to the belief that he is buying that article."
Moreover, Hebe was "shown to be wholesome and free from impurities."20 3 Day conceded that the public was "entitled to protection from deception as well as from impurity," and noted that
the record disclosed "that in one or more instances" dealers had
represented Hebe to be condensed whole milk. "But an act or two
of this sort by fraudulent dealers," Day insisted, "ought not to be
the test of the plaintiffs' right." "If such were the case, very few
food compounds would escape condemnation." Moreover, "[t]he
few instances of deception shown had not the sanction" of the
company's authority. Such acts of deception "did violence to the
plain terms" of the printed label. That label "so truly expresses
just what the substance is," Day concluded, that it was "difficult
to believe that any purchaser could be deceived into buying the
article for something other than it is."2" 4
In the floor debates on the filled milk bill, opponents predictably
invoked the authority of Hammer. They argued that filled milk
was neither injurious, deleterious, unwholesome, nor harmful to
health, nor was it sold fraudulently, and therefore Congress lacked
the power to prohibit its interstate shipment.20 5 To this proponents
202

Id.

203Id

at 306.

" Id at 307 (Day and Brandeis, JJ, dissenting).
205 62 Cong Rec 7581, 7584, 7588, 7593-94, 7614 (May 24, 1922). See also Senate
Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 280-81 (cited in note 152).
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responded with citations to Hebe.20 6 Because filled milk was, on
their view, "deleterious to health"2 07 and "a fraudulent article,"2 08
Congress could prohibit its interstate shipment.2 09 Hammer therefore had "nothing to do" with the question of the bill's constitutionality.210 The bill was instead governed by the precedents
upholding the Lottery Act and the Pure Food and Drugs Act.211
The legislators engaged in this debate did not expressly frame
the issue of constitutionality in terms of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.2 12 But they shared a tacit premise: if an
item was sufficiently deleterious that its sale could be prohibited
under the state's police power consistent with the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, then Congress had the power to exclude the article from interstate commerce. The central issue upon which the disputants differed,
therefore, was whether the Court had correctly resolved the due
process issue in Hebe. That was an issue that would soon divide
the state courts as well.

IV. CAROLENE PRODUCTS IN COURT
As the agricultural depression of the 1920s deepened, most
of the states in the Union passed laws prohibiting the manufacture
and/or sale of filled milk. By 1938, thirty-four of the forty-eight
states had enacted such statutes, while an additional three subjected the sale to strict regulations.2 1 3 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed Hebe in sustaining the state's
filled milk statute as a health and fraud prevention measure in
206 62 Cong Rec 7581, 7612 (May 24, 1922). See also Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, Ist
Sess at 277-78, 281 (cited in note 152).
207 62 Cong Rec 7588, 7613, 7617 (May 24, 1922); Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st
Sess at 278 (cited in note 152).
20 62 Cong Rec 7590, 7588, 7593, 7596, 7613, 7617 (May 24, 1922); Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st Sess at 278 (cited in note 152).
209 62 Cong Rec 7590, 7592-93, 7596, 7613, 7617 (May 24, 1922); 64 Cong Rec 3949
(February 19, 1923). See also Senate Hearings, 67th Cong, 1st Sess at 277-78 (cited in
note 152).
210 62 Cong Rec 7596 (May 24, 1922) (remarks
of Mr. Hersey). See also Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st Sess at 278-79 (cited in note 152).
211 62 Cong Rec 7583, 7593 (May
24, 1922).
212 By contrast, J. Wallace Bryan did so at the Senate hearings.
See Senate Hearings,
67th Cong, 1st Sess at 277-78 (cited in note 152).
213 Carolene Products, 304 US at 150-51 n 3.
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1922.214 In the 1930s, however, the Carolene Products Company
began a litigation campaign with the objective of persuading various state courts to hold that their filled milk statutes violated
provisions of their own state constitutions. The highest courts of
Illinois, 2 1s Michigan, 216 and Nebraska21 7 agreed that there was no
significant evidence of fraud in the sale of filled milk, and that the
product and its ingredients were wholesome and healthful. Prohibitions on its manufacture and sale therefore exceeded the state's
police power. The company also secured injunctions against enforcement of the statutes of Alabama, Iowa, Missouri, Virginia,
and West Virginia. 218 The Illinois Supreme Court's decision established that state as a safe haven for the production of filled
milk in 193 1,219 and the Carolene Products Company continued
manufacture of its product there at the Litchfield Creamery south
of Springfield.2 2 0
The company's successful campaign in the state courts spurred
federal officials to action. In June of 1935, the company was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois under the federal statute for unlawfully shipping
filled milk from Litchfield, Illinois, to the General Grocer Company in St. Louis, Missouri. 2 21 The company immediately filed a
motion to quash the indictment, 222 on which the trial court inexplicably sat for over two years before overruling it in July of
Carnation Milk Products Co. v Emery, 189 NW 564 (Wis 1922).
People v Carolene Products Co., 345 Ill 166, 170 (1931) (distinguishing Hebe on the
ground that "[iun the case before us the wholesomeness of the product is admitted, with
no question of imitation or deceit involved, so there is no debatable question of fact before
the court, as there was in the Ohio case."); Carolene Products Co. v McLaughlin, 365 Ill 62
(1936) (following its earlier decision in invalidating revised statute).
"' Carolene Products Co. v Thomson, 267 NW 608, 612 (Mich 1936) (doubting Hebe's
continuing authority, distinguishing details of the Michigan and Ohio statutes, and holding
that the Michigan statute violated both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the state constitution).
" Carolene Products Co. v Banning, 268 NW 313 (Neb 1936) (following the reasoning
of Thomson in holding that the statute violated both the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Nebraska constitution).
218 Carolene Brief at
*68.
219 Carolene Products Co., 345 Ill 166; Miller, 1987 Supreme Court Review at 411
(cited
in note 151).
220 Carolene Brief at
*7.
214
215

221 Brief for the United States, United States v Carolene Products,No 604, *4-5 (US filed
Feb 28, 1938) ("United States Brief I").
222 Id at
5.
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1937.223 The company then filed a demurrer to the indictment,

alleging that the federal Filled Milk Act was unconstitutional.2 24
That October, some six months after the Supreme Court had
upheld the National Labor Relations Act the preceding April,2 25
the trial court sustained the company's demurrer on the authority
of Hammer, following the reasoning of a 1934 opinion by Judge
FitzHenry of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois.2 2 6 Judge FitzHenry had reasoned that Carolene's product was "wholesome and plainly labeled," and therefore
beyond congressional power to exclude from interstate commerce. 227 Seeking to distinguish Hebe, FitzHenry concluded that
Hammer made it "clear that the Supreme Court recognized a broad
discretion in the states in the exercise of their legislative police
powers, but denies the exercise of the same power to Congress,
under the guise of regulating interstate commerce."22 The United
States then filed an appeal, 2 29 and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under the Criminal Appeals Act.230 On April 25,
1938, the Court announced its decision reversing the trial court
and upholding the constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act.2 31
The first key move in Justice Stone's opinion for the majority
was to disentangle the Commerce Clause issue from the due process issue. The power to regulate interstate commerce, which in223

Id.

Id.
Labor Board Cases, 301 US 1 (1937).
226United States Brief I at *5. The trial court sustained the demurrer "for the reasons
assigned in the opinion of Judge FitzHenry, reported in 7 Fed Supp 500." Id.
227 United States v Carolene Products, 7 F Supp at 500, 508 (SD Ill 1934). The government's brief before the Supreme Court explained that Judge FitzHenry's decision "was
not appealed by the United States because the case arose on an information, and the
sustaining of a demurrer thereto is not appealable under the Criminal Appeals Act." United
States Brief I at *9 n 1.
22 CaroTlene Products, 7 F Supp at 508. FitzHenry appeared to believe that the statute
was "a plain attempt on the part of Congress" to "prohibit the manufacture" of filled milk
in the several states, id at 504, and that this "strik[ing] down [of) a well-known lawful
industry" deprived the company of property without due process. Id at 507.
229United States Brief I at *5.
230Id; Carolene Products, 304 US at 146.
231 Carolene Products, 304 US at 144-45. On January 7, 1938, the Seventh Circuit had
upheld the act in a deferential opinion ruling against the Carolene Products Company in
an antitrust action the company brought against the Evaporated Milk Association. Carolene
Products Co. v Evaporated Milk Assn., 93 F2d 202 (7th Cir 1938). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had upheld that state's filled milk act on the authority of Hebe on March 2,
1938. Carolene Products Co. v Harter,329 Pa 49 (1938).
224
225
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cluded the power to prohibit interstate shipment, Stone reminded
his readers, was "'complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed
by the Constitution."'23 2 Decisions such as those upholding the
Lottery Act and the Pure Food and Drugs Act established that
Congress was "free to exclude from interstate commerce articles
whose use in the states for which they are destined it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals, or
welfare."233 Such regulations were "not prohibited unless by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 234 "The prohibition
of the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce" was therefore "a permissible regulation of commerce, subject only to the
restrictions of the Fifth Amendment. 235 Stone's opinion thus established that the power to prohibit interstate shipment was not
constrained by any internal limitation on the commerce power,
but was instead plenary, and was qualified only by affirmative limitations derived from other applicable provisions of the Constitution-namely, the Due Process Clause.
Having disposed of the commerce power issue, Stone turned to
the due process issue, which it was now clear would be dispositive.
That issue was properly analyzed separately, employing the categories developed in cases adjudicating Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to regulatory legislation. Stone remarked
that the committee hearings had demonstrated "that the use of
filled milk as a substitute for pure milk" was "generally injurious
to health and facilitates fraud on the public."236 In other words,
it fell into two categories under which the Court had sustained
state exercises of the police power. Indeed, it was on the basis of
such evidence that the Court had upheld the Ohio statute challenged in Hebe against a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge twenty years earlier. 237 That alone would seem to have been
sufficient to decide the case.
But here Stone went further. Even without the evidence to
which he had referred, "the existence of facts supporting the leg232
233

Carolene Products, 304 US at 147, quoting Gibbons v Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 196 (1824).
Carolene Products, 304 US at 147 (emphasis added).

234Id.
23s

Id at 148.
at 148-49.

236Id
23"

Carolene Products, 304 US at 148, citing Hebe Co. v Shaw, 248 US 297 (1918).
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islative judgment" was "to be presumed," he wrote, "for regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.""' Had the statute
contained no findings concerning the dangers filled milk posed to
the public, Stone observed, some such findings "would be presumed."239 Inquiries into a statute's compliance with the Due Process Clause, "where the legislative judgment is drawn in question,
must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for
it."240 That is, as Stone put it, the Court might have decided the
due process issue "wholly on the presumption of constitutionality." 24 1 But it was "evident from all the considerations presented
to Congress," Stone continued, "that the question is at least debatable whether commerce in filled milk should be left unregulated, or in some measure restricted, or wholly prohibited." 2 42
Whether to protect the public through the imposition of a labeling
requirement or through a prohibition on shipment "was a matter
for the legislative judgment and not that of courts." 2 43 "[T]hat
decision was for Congress." 2 ' The prohibition of the interstate
shipment of filled milk thus did "not infringe the Fifth Amendment" ;24 and therefore, Stone concluded, that prohibition was "a

Id at 152.
Id at 153.
240 Id at 154. Just two months earlier, Stone had anticipated this formulation in announcing that nondiscriminatory state legislation would be subjected to the same standard
of review under the dormant Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. See
South CarolinaHighway Dept. v Barnwell Bros., 303 US 177, 190-91 (1938) ("In the absence
of [congressional] legislation the judicial function, under the commerce clause, . . . as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the inquiry whether the state Legislature in
adopting regulations such as the present has acted within its province, and whether the
means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought.... Being a legislative
judgment it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legislature unless facts
judicially known or proved preclude that possibility.").
241 Carolene Products, 304 US at 148.
242 Id at 154.
238
239

24

Id at 151.

24

Id at 154.

245 Id at 148.
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constitutional exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce." 246
Two years earlier, in Whitfield v Ohio, the Court unanimously
had upheld an Ohio statute prohibiting the sale of convict-made
goods within the state against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.
Congress had enacted a statute divesting convict-made goods of
their interstate character upon their arrival in a destination state,
thereby removing the dormant Commerce Clause disability under
which the state otherwise would labor by virtue of the original
package doctrine. The sole question concerning the state law's
constitutionality thus was whether the Ohio statute deprived the
owner of the goods of his property without due process. The
Justices agreed that Ohio had "the right and power" to base its
legislation upon the "conception" that "the sale of convict-made
goods in competition with free labor is an evil." 24 7 The Court thus
rejected Judge O'Brien's insistence in Hawkins that the prevention
of such "unfair competition" was not a legitimate police power
justification for the regulation of such sales, and some contemporary commentators maintained that this development cast significant doubt on the continuing vitality of Hammer.2 48 Others
were more circumspect, suggesting only that Congress could enact
a similar divesting statute for child-made goods without calling
into question Hammer's continuing authority.2 49
In January of 1937, the Court unanimously upheld the federal
Ashurst-Sumners Act, which prohibited the interstate shipment of
convict-made goods into states where their sale was prohibited by
24 Id at 154. Justice Butler concurred in the result. His opinion indicated that he agreed
with the majority's mode of Commerce Clause analysis, but that he differed with its due
process views. Butler maintained that at the ensuing trial the Carolene Products Company
"may introduce evidence to show that the declaration of the act that the described product
is injurious to public health and that the sale of it is a fraud upon the public are without
any substantial foundation. . . . If construed to exclude from interstate commerce wholesome food products that demonstrably are neither injurious to health nor calculated to
deceive, they are repugnant to the Fifth Amendment." Id at 155 (Butler, J, concurring).
247 Whitfield v Ohio, 297 US 431, 439-40 (1936).
248 See J. A. C. Grant, State Power to Prohibit Interstate Commerce,
26 Cal L Rev 34, 67
(1937); Hugh Evander Willis, Constitution Making in 1935-36, 22 Wash U L Q 206, 214
(1936); Comment, Interstate Commerce-Power of Congress-Validity of Hawes-Cooper Act
and State Statute ProhibitingSale of Convict-Made Goods, 49 Harv L Rev 1007, 1008 (1936).
249Marvin M. Finder, ConstitutionalLaw-Divesting Prison-MadeGoods of Their Interstate
Character-OriginalPackage
Doctrine, 27 J Am Inst Crim L & Criminol 283, 284-85 (1936);
Note, The Power of Congress to Subject Interstate Commerce to State Regulation, 3 U Chi L
Rev 636, 639-40 (1936).
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local law.250 Again, a number of sanguine commentators proclaimed the demise of Hammer.2 5' Yet the act's cooperative formula
differed from the absolute prohibition on interstate shipment imposed by the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, and Chief Justice
Hughes accordingly declined the opportunity to overrule Hammer.
Instead, he tersely distinguished the precedent, maintaining that
the act under review could be sustained without impairing Hammer's vitality.25 2 Even after that decision, therefore, numerous
commentators continued to believe that Hammer remained good
law.253 After Carolene Products had made clear that the commerce
power was subject only to a due process limitation and that that
limitation would be interpreted very narrowly, however, such views
would dissipate. For if Justice Stone's proclamation of deferential
review under the Due Process Clause clarified anything, it was
that the traditional understanding of the Doctrine of Vested Rights
was no longer the basic doctrine of American constitutional law.

250

Kentucky Whip 6 Collar Co. v Illinois CentralRailroad Co., 299 US 334 (1937).

251Edward S. Corwin, National-State Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities, 46 Yale L

J

599, 613-15, 623 (1937); Grant, 26 Cal L Rev at 34, 69-70 (cited in note 248); Anthony
Yturri, Note, ConstitutionalLaw-InterstateCommerce-Convict-LaborGoods-Ashurst-Sumners Act, 16 Or L Rev 374, 380-82, 384 (1937); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Exclusion
of Prison-Made Goodsfrom Interstate Commerce, 14 Tenn L Rev 538, 539-41 (1937); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Commerce Clause-Validity of Statute Regulating Interstate Transportation of Convict-Made Goods, 85 U Pa L Rev 529, 530 (1937); E. A. M., Comment,
Constitutional Law-Convict-Made Goods-Interstate Commerce, 12 Ind L J 430, 431-32
(1937); L. E., Comment, Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Prison-Made GoodsPower of Federal Government to Prohibit Shipment of Prison-Made Goods Into Any State in
Violation of Its Laws, 6 Brooklyn L Rev 385, 386 (1937).
252 Kentucky Whip, 299 US at 350.
153 See, for example, Joseph H. Mueller, Comment, Constitutional
Law-Interstate Commerce-Validity of Federal Statute ProhibitingInterstate Shipment of Prison-Made Goods, 35
Mich L Rev 615, 617-20 (1937); John H. Foard, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Interstate
Commerce-Federal Control of Child Labor as Suggested by the Recent Convict Labor Cases, 2
Mo L Rev 341, 342-46 (1937); Marjorie Hanson, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Interstate
Commerce-Power of Congress to Protect State Laws, 3 U Pitt L Rev 233, 235-36 (1937);
Milton J. Schloss, Comment, Child Labor Regulation Under the Kentucky Whip and Collar
Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Case, 11 U Cin L Rev 357, 358-59 (1937); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Power of Congress to Regulate Interstate Transportation of Prison-Made Goods, 6 Fordham L Rev 299, 302-03 (1937); J. T. N., Comment,
ConstitutionalLaw-Commerce-Powerof Congress to Give Effect to State Law, 15 Tex L Rev
371, 372 (1937); E. J. H., Jr., Note, FederalLegislation-RegulationofChild LaborResurrected,
25 Geo L J 671, 678, 682, 687 (1937). Still others expressed uncertainty about Hammer's
status. See, for example, Osmond K. Fraenkel, What Can Be Done About the Constitution
and the Supreme Court? 37 Colum L Rev 212, 213, 215 (1937); S. R., Comment, Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-ProhibitingInterstate Shipment of Prison-MadeGoods, 11
Temple L Q 427, 429-30 (1937).
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THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF CAROLENE PRODUCTS

To appreciate the impact of CaroleneProductson Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, consider the legislative history of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. In May of 1937, nearly a year before
the Court would decide Carolene Products, the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce conducted a series of hearings on five
bills concerning child labor.254 Some of the bills, like the statute
invalidated in Hammer, would have prohibited interstate shipment
of goods made by firms employing child labor.2 " Others took
different approaches that would not directly have called into question Hammer's continuing authority, either divesting child-made
goods of their interstate character upon arrival in a destination
state, or prohibiting interstate shipment of child-made goods into
states prohibiting their sale.256 Even after the Court's dramatic
decisions upholding the National Labor Relations Act as an exercise of the commerce power the previous month,257 two liberal
New Dealers on the committee expressed doubt that the Court
was prepared to overrule Hammer. Burton Wheeler of Montana
believed that the Court "would probably not" overrule Hammer.
There was "not very much hope," he opined, "of the Supreme
Court reversing itself in this matter."258 Sherman Minton of Indiana agreed: "I do not think we need place much hope on a
reversal of the child labor opinion." "I do not think that there is
much use of our looking for a reversal of form on the part of the
Court."2 5 9 Some of the witnesses expressed similar reservations,26 0
254 To Regulate the Products of Child Labor, Hearings on S 592, S 1976, S 2068, and
S 2345 before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong, 1st Sess (1937)
("Senate Interstate Commerce Hearings").
255 S 2068, 75th Cong, Ist Sess and S 2345, 75th Cong, 1st Sess,
in Senate Interstate
Commerce Hearings, 75th Cong, 1st Sess (cited in note 254).
256 S 592, 75th Cong, 1st Sess and S 1976, 75th Cong, Ist Sess,
in Senate Interstate
Commerce Hearings, 75th Cong, 1st Sess (cited in note 254). S 2226, 75th Cong, 1st
Sess, in Senate Interstate Commerce Hearings, 75th Cong, 1st Sess (cited in note 254)
combined each of the approaches.
257 See Labor Board Cases, 301 US
1 (1937).

258Senate Interstate Commerce Hearings, 75th Cong, 1st Sess at 12, 13 (cited in note
254).
259Senate Interstate Commerce Hearings, 75th Cong, 1st Sess at 13 (cited in note 254).
260Senate Interstate Commerce Hearings, 75th Cong, 1st Sess at 152-58 (cited in note
254) (James A. Emery, National Association of Manufacturers, maintaining that Hammer
was still good law); id at 133 (Henry Root Stern, of Mudge, Stern, Williams, & Tucker,
suggesting that there was an even chance that the Court would overrule Hammer).
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and on June 14 the committee favorably reported the WheelerJohnson bill that combined the Keating-Owen approach with the
other methods in the event that the Court reaffirmed Hammer.261
It was the committee's judgment that "much hope could not be
practically entertained that the Supreme Court would overrule the
Hammer v Dagenhartcase at this time." 262
Meanwhile, on May 24 the Administration sent to Congress
what would become known as the Black-Connery bill, which ultimately would form the basis for the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938.263 At joint hearings held by the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor and the House Committee on Labor, several
witnesses continued to opine that Hammer was still good law, 26 4
but on July 8 the Senate Committee on Education and Labor
reported favorably a version of the bill relying entirely on a provision modeled on the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act.26 5 When
the bill reached the floor of the Senate, however, Wheeler argued
that it was imprudent to enact a measure "flying directly in the
face of the Supreme Court decision in Hammer v Dagenhart,"and
urged his colleagues to substitute the Wheeler-Johnson bill for
the child labor provisions of the Black-Connery bill. 66 His colleagues apparently agreed with Wheeler's assessment, for they
approved the amendment by a vote of 57-28,267 and the bill as
amended was passed by a vote of 56-28.268 The House Labor
Committee did not agree, however-its reported bill stripped out
the Wheeler-Johnson provisions and reinserted the child labor
provisions that Wheeler had considered so objectionable. 269 The
261 Regulating the Products of Child Labor, S Rep No 75-726, 75th Cong,
1st Sess
(1937); 81 Cong Rec 5639 (June 14, 1937).
262 S Rep No 75-726 at 2-3 (cited in note
261).
263 Message from the President of the United States, H Doc 225, 75th Cong, 1st Sess
(May 24, 1937); 81 Cong Rec 4954 (May 24, 1937) (referencing S 2475, 75th Cong, 1st
Sess introduced by Mr. Black); id at 4998 (referencing HR 7200, 75th Cong, 1st Sess
introduced by Mr. Connery).
2" Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937, Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, and House Committee on Labor, 75th Cong,
1st Sess 626-27 (1937) ("Joint Hearings"); id at 681-82, 855-59.
265 Fair Labor Standards Act, S Rep No 75-884, 75th Cong, 1st Sess (1937);
81 Cong
Rec 6894 (July 8, 1937).
266 81 Cong Rec 7667 (July 27, 1937); id at 7666; id at 7930-32 (July 31, 1937); id at
7949.
267 81 Cong Rec 7949-51 (July 31, 1937).
268 Id at 7957.
26 Fair Labor Standards Act, HR Rep No 1452, 75th Cong, 1st Sess 20 (1937).
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House Rules Committee refused to allow the Labor Committee's
bill to come to the floor,2 70 so on August 19 Wheeler urged his
Senate colleagues to pass the Wheeler-Johnson bill as a separate
piece of legislation,271 which they did without a record vote.2 72
When the Black-Connery bill was finally brought to the House
floor in November through the use of a discharge petition,2 73 Representative John Martin of Colorado followed Wheeler in cautioning his colleagues not to rely on the hope that the Court would
overrule Hammer. Instead, he urged his fellow Democrats to replace the bill's child labor provisions with those of the WheelerJohnson bill.2 74 The bill was recommitted to the House Labor
Committee on December 17,275 and the committee did not report
it back until April 2 1.276 When the bill was debated on the floor
of the House in May of 1938, however, Martin's lengthy speech
opposing the measure no longer expressed concerns about the
constitutionality of a prohibition on interstate shipment of goods
made by firms employing children.277 Now no one in the House
debate objected to the bill on the ground that Hammer was still
good law. The House passed the bill relying on the assumption
that Hammer would be overruled, 2 78 and the conference committee
accepted the House bill's child labor provisions.279 Senator Elbert
Duncan Thomas of Utah explained to his colleagues that "[t]he
conference committee felt that in view of the trend of decisions
in the Supreme Court this was safe procedure," and no one con270 See William Lasser, Benjamin V Cohen: Architect of the New Deal 180 (Yale,
2002);
John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law & Contemp
Probs 464, 470 (1939); Paul H. Douglas and Joseph Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, Part 1, 53 Pol Sci Q 491, 507-08 (1938).
171 81 Cong Rec 9318 (August 19, 1937).
272 Id at 9318-20.
273 82 Cong Rec 1386, 1389-90 (December 13, 1937); Forsythe, Legislative
History at
471 (cited in note 270); Douglas and Hackman, 53 Pol Sci Q at 509 (cited in note 270);
Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew 260 (Viking, 1946); Rally Democrats Behind Wage
Bill, New York Times 9 (Nov 30, 1937); 218 Sign Petition, New York Times 1 (Dec 3,
1937).
274 82 Cong Rec 1412-23 (December 13, 1937); id at 1579-99
(December 15, 1937);
id at 1780-83 (December 17, 1937); id at 1829-30.
275 Id at 1834-35 (December 17,
1937).

.7.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, HR Rep No 2182, 75th Cong, 3d Sess (1938);
83 Cong Rec 5680 (April 21, 1938).
277 See 83 Cong Rec 7398-7400 (May 24, 1938).
278
271

Id at 7449-50.
Id at 9161, 9164 (June 14, 1938) (remarks of Sen. Thomas).
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tradicted him.280 Senator Thomas did not cite the decisions upon
which he was relying, but the Court had decided only two pertinent cases since Wheeler, Minton, Martin, and others had
evinced their concerns that Hammer was still good law. One was
a decision upholding portions of the New Deal securities law program;2 8' the other was Carolene Products.
Two commentators anticipating a favorable Court ruling on the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act noted in 1938
that Carolene Products had recognized "the power of Congress to
prohibit interstate shipments of products harmful to the health,
morals, or welfare of the public," and insisted that "[e]conomic
evil or harm as well as harm to the human body is within the
police power of Congress to control by prohibitory regulation of
interstate commerce."282 Another observer cautioned that, after
CaroleneProducts, "serious thought must be given to the possibility
of revolutionary expansion in Congress' exercise of the commerce
power." It was now conceivable, he argued, that the Court would
soon adopt the view expressed by Justice Holmes in his dissent in
Hammer: that Congress may by the regulation of interstate commerce "'prohibit any part of such commerce that Congress sees
fit to forbid." 28 3
When the Fair Labor Standards Act was challenged before the
Supreme Court in United States v Darby Lumber, the brief for the
United States repeatedly cited Carolene Products in support of the
central claims of its argument.284 The act's prohibition on interstate shipment was a regulation of interstate commerce,2 85 and the
Court had often "proclaimed that the power of Congress to regulate commerce 'is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre280 Id at 9164 (1938). The House approved the
conference report by a vote of 291-89,
and the Senate followed suit without a record vote. 83 Cong Rec 9178, 9266-67 (June
14, 1938).
"' Electric Bond & Share Co. v SEC, 303 US 419 (1938).
282 Alexander Feller and Jacob Hurwitz, How to Operate Under the Wage-Hour
Law 14243 (Alexander, 1938).
.8.Recent Decision, ConstitutionalLaw-Power to Prohibit Wholesome Synthetic Foodfrom
Interstate Commerce, 17 NYU L Q Rev 118, 121 (1939).
284 See Brief for the United States, United States v Darby, No 82, *41,
63, 65, 101 (US
filed Sep 23, 1940) ("United States Brief Il").
28'

Id at 61.
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scribed in the constitution,' 286 the government argued. "Congress
possesses, therefore, the same unlimited authority as do the states
within their field to exercise 'the police power, for the benefit of
the public, within the field of interstate commerce.' 287 The public
benefit to be secured here, as the United States contended at
length, was the prevention of the spread of substandard labor
conditions through unfair competition carried on through the
channels of interstate commerce. 288 "The determination of what
practices are against public policy" was "obviously a legislative
matter," the government asserted.289 It was "for Congress to decide
whether low labor standards" were "as harmful" as the acts prohibited by the antitrust laws and the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 290 The employer could "rely upon no fact in the record," and
had "as yet presented none which is subject to judicial notice, to
show that the legislation" was "arbitrary." 291 As Carolene Products
had established, "[t]he burden of supporting the charge of unconstitutionality" was "on the assailant of the statute. In the absence of facts demonstrating its invalidity the constitutionality of
the law must be presumed."2 92
When Chief Justice Hughes brought the case before the conference, his doctrinal analysis was a virtual facsimile of Stone's in
Carolene Products. Hughes regarded the branch of the case concerning the prohibition of interstate shipment as utterly unproblematic. "Congress's interstate commerce power knows no limitation except as in the Constitution itself," Hughes argued. 29 3 The
286Id at 63.
287 Id at 64-65. Similarly, in a proposed model opinion upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act, Robert Stern relied upon Carolene Products for the proposition that "an exercise
of federal power is not invalid because of its effect upon transactions which might lie
outside the sphere of federal regulation." Robert L. Stern, An Opinion Holding the Act
Constitutional, in How the Supreme Court May View the FairLabor Standards Act, 6 Law &
Contemp Probs 431, 434 (1939).
288

United States Brief II at *9, 20-43, 59-60.

289United States Brief II at *77.
290

Id.

"' Id at 101.
292 Id. The appellee by contrast maintained that under CaroleneProductsthe presumption
of constitutionality attached only to the means selected for exercising an enumerated
power. Whether Congress was in fact exercising an enumerated power, that is, whether
a statute was within the commerce power, remained a question for judicial determination.
Brief for the Appellee, United States v Darby, No 82, *23-25 (US filed Dec 12, 1940)
("Darby Brief").
293 Del Dickson, ed, The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985) 217 (Oxford, 2001).
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Chief therefore rejected the authority of Hammer v Dagenbart.
"Transportation is an act in commerce, and unless due process is
involved, Congress can do as it wants. Congress must not impinge
on the constitutional qualifications of its power, and this qualification is in the due process provision. Unless the Fifth Amendment
intervenes, Congress can use its power for any purpose it sees
fit."294 But here, Hughes concluded, there was "no deprivation of
property in a due process sense." 29 5
Justice Stone's opinion for a unanimous Court also clearly followed the template that he had established in Carolene Products.
While manufacture was "not of itself interstate commerce," the
interstate shipment of manufactured goods was, and "the prohibition of such shipment by Congress" was "indubitably a regulation" of that commerce.2 96 The power of Congress over interstate
commerce was "'complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed
by the constitution." 2 9 7 "Congress, following its own conception
of public policy concerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce," was "free to exclude
from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they
are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health,
morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate
their use."29 8 And then, with a citation to Carolene Products, Stone
asserted, "Such regulation .

.

. is not prohibited unless by other

Constitutional provisions. It is no objection to the assertion of the
power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended
by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power
of the states."299 " hatever their motive and purpose, regulations
of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the
Commerce Clause."3"o In Hammer, "it was held by a bare majority
of the Court over the powerful and now classic dissent of Mr.
Justice Holmes," "that Congress was without power to exclude
294

Id.

Id at 218.
Darby, 312 US at 113.
297 Id at 114.

295

296

299

Id.
Id.

300

Id at 115.

298
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the products of child labor from interstate commerce. The reasoning and conclusion of the Court's opinion there cannot be
reconciled with the conclusion which we have reached, that the
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is plenary to
exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only to the
specific prohibitions of the Constitution." 30 1
The only specific prohibition to be addressed was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. And Stone regarded it as
obvious that the interstate shipment of goods made under substandard labor conditions caused a harm that it was within congressional power to prevent. A purpose of the act, Stone explained,
was "to prevent the use of interstate commerce as the means of
competition in the distribution of goods" produced "under conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards
of living necessary for health and general well-being," "and as the
means of spreading and perpetuating such substandard labor conditions among the workers of the several states."302 The motive
and purpose of the act were "plainly to make effective the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce
should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions,
which competition" was "injurious" to the states "to which the
commerce flows."303 "[T]he evils aimed at by the Act" were "the
spread of substandard labor conditions through the use of the
facilities of interstate commerce" through the competition of
goods produced under substandard labor conditions with goods
produced under fair labor standards, and the "impairment or destruction of local businesses by competition made effective
through interstate commerce."' The act was thus, like the Ohio
convict-made goods statute upheld in Whitfield, "directed at the
suppression of a method or kind of competition in interstate commerce which it has in effect condemned as 'unfair."'30 s In short,
the Court was now explicitly broadening the category of harms
that could be redressed by the commerce power without violating
the Due Process Clause, recognizing as a federally remediable
30'
302
303

Id at 115-16.
Id at 109-10.
Id at 115.

* Id at 122.
30s

Id.
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harm in destination states the very sort of unfair competition resulting from differential labor standards that the Court had refused
to countenance in Hammer. Thus, it did not matter whether the
goods to be shipped in interstate commerce had been made under
conditions permitted by the law of the state of production. The
producer might have acquired a vested property interest in the
goods under that state's law, but he had not thereby acquired any
right to inflict the harm of unfair competition outside the legislative jurisdiction of that state. Because the statute did not violate
the Due Process Clause, the Court concluded "that the prohibition
of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden
substandard labor conditions" was "within the constitutional authority of Congress."30 6
Legal commentators remarking upon the Darby decision clearly
saw its roots in Stone's 1938 opinion. With a citation to Carolene
Products, an observer writing in the University of PennsylvaniaLaw
Review opined now that "[t]he weight of authority is that Congress
can prohibit goods from interstate commerce regardless of their
nature, or regardless of the motive of Congress in so enacting."3 07
With another citation to Carolene Products, an editor of the Tennessee Law Review astutely noted, "Thus the separate regulatory
power of the states, once so jealously guarded, is made to rest
squarely on whatever due process restrictions the fifth amendment
imposes on Congress."o' That, of course, is precisely what Carolene Productshad clarified; and it had further made clear that those
restrictions were few indeed.

30' Id at 115. For a discussion of developments in the constitutional law of competitive
injury that anticipated Darby, see Barry Cushman, Ambiguities of Free Labor Revisited: The
Convict-Labor Question in Progressive-EraNew York, in R. B. Bernstein and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, eds, Making Legal History: Essays on the Interpretation of Legal History in Honor of
William E. Nelson (NYU Press, forthcoming 2013) (on file with author).
30 Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Power of Congress to Regulate Wages and Hours in
Industries Producingfor and Shipping in Interstate Commerce, 89 U Pa L Rev 819, 820 n 4
(1941). Other commentators on Darby also saw CaroleneProductsas a supportive Commerce
Clause precedent. See John A. Wright, Case Note, FairLabor StandardsAct: Regulation of
Wages and Hours in Production of Goods for Interstate Commerce Held Constitutional-Requirement of Keeping Records Upheld-Validity of Minimum Wage Order Sustained, 6 John
Marshall L Q 451, 452 (1941); M. W. M., Note, Constitutional Law-Power of Congress to
Prohibit Interstate Transportation of ProductsMade Under Substandard Conditions-FairLabor
StandardsAct of 1938, 15 Tulane L Rev 609, 611 (1941).
30. A. D. B., Jr., Recent Case, Commerce-Regulation Under FairLabor StandardsAct, 16
Tenn L Rev 987, 988 (1941).
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VI. CONCLUSION: CAROLENE PRODUCTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE

Darby would become the canonical case standing for the
proposition that congressional power to prohibit interstate ship-

ment is virtually plenary. It was the seminal case upholding the
Fair Labor Standards Act-a much more important statute than
the Filled Milk Act of 1923-and it was the case that overruled
Hammer v Dagenhart. But the doctrinal analysis on which the
Court relied in Darby was already fully developed by Stone's opinion in Carolene Products. CaroleneProductsuntangled the confusions
created by Hammer's conflation of Fifth and Tenth Amendment
limitations, making it clear that the restraint on Congress's power
to prohibit interstate shipment had always been the Due Process
Clause rather than a principle of constitutional federalism.
Through the limits that it had placed on federal regulatory authority and the protection it had afforded to vested property rights,
the Due Process Clause had licensed interjurisdictional regulatory
competition and underwritten policy heterogeneity among the
states.30 9 It was the relaxation of that due process limitation by an
announced standard of deferential review that cleared the way for
national policies implemented through prohibitions on interstate
shipment.
We have grown understandably accustomed to dividing our
courses in and our conversations about Constitutional Law into
the categories of Constitutional Structure and Constitutional
Rights. But we shouldn't allow that often convenient conceptual
division to obscure the deep and important relationships that often
have obtained between these two domains of constitutional doctrine. The idea that constitutional federalism acts to preserve individual rights and liberties by diffusing government power has
become familiar."o Less often appreciated is the fact that individual
" The role played by the Due Process Clause in this line of Commerce Clause cases
also serves further to underscore the centrality of vested rights concepts to substantive
due process jurisprudence in the early twentieth century. Substantive due process often is
associated with the sorts of liberty claims implicated in decisions such as Locbner v New
York, 198 US 45 (1905), and Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923). Yet a review of all of
the cases in which the Lochner-era Court invalidated a law on the ground that it violated
one of the Due Process Clauses reveals that decisions safeguarding vested property rights
far outnumbered those vindicating such unenumerated liberty rights. See Cushman, 85
BU L Rev at 883-924, 941-44, 958-80, 998-99 (cited in note 145).
3o See, for example, New York v United States, 505 US 144, 181 (1992) ("'[Fiederalism
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power."'),
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rights, particularly economic rights protected by the Due Process
Clause, themselves operated as structural mechanisms. Such rights
did not merely mark the boundaries between individual liberty
and sovereign authority. They also functioned to allocate power
among the state and federal governments. Just as structural mechanisms could have consequences for rights, so rights could have
significant consequences for constitutional structure."' Because of
its role in illuminating such an important dimension of this phenomenon, Justice Stone's opinion in Carolene Products is, if anything, even richer and more rewarding than we have recognized.

quoting Coleman v Thompson, 501 US 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J, dissenting); Harry
N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives,9 U Toledo L Rev 619 (1978); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process:
The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Supreme Court Review 341, 385-86,
388-89 (1986).
" For discussions of other contexts in which the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
played an important role in the allocation of regulatory authority among the state and
federal governments, see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of
a ConstitutionalRevolution 139-225 (Oxford, 1998); Barry Cushman, Formalismand Realism
in Commerce ClauseJurisprudence, 67 U Chi L Rev 1089, 1126-37 (2000); Barry Cushman,
The Structure of Classical Public Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 1917, 1936-47 (2008).

